

THE NEW DEMOCRACY

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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RUSSIA & DEMOCRACY :
THE GERMAN CANKER IN RUSSIA.

RUSSIA & DEMOCRACY:

THE GERMAN CANCKER IN RUSSIA.

BY

G. DE WESSELITSKY,

WITH A PREFACE

BY

HENRY CUST.

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PREFACE.

THE enlightenment of war may be counted among the very few advantages war brings to man. War strips bare and illuminates what peace disguises and huddles away. And this is true not only of men and nations, but of attitudes of mind and trends of thought and policy, of which, after dim movings and returnings, appearances and vanishings, the long results stand suddenly apart and clear; unexpected, but, it seems, inevitable. Things futile and fortuitous are seen as ordered processes; and the unmeaning takes on significance. This war has already left many men and nations mother-naked, and later has exposed, for good or for bad, the very nerves of their spines and the convolutions of their brains. The world went travelling a year ago, and discovered Germany, France and England, nations hitherto unknown; discovered them equipped with a psychology, histology, pathology, &c., undreamed-of by the newest science. But, in judging Russia, who was also girding her loins, men were the more perplexed, because their means of diagnosis, especially of political diagnosis, were scant and faulty. Here was a state of mind which seemed of sudden birth; an impulse, a conviction, a unity, a faith; a creed, unpreached, unformulated, and yet of perfervid and overmastering vehemence. Whence grew the flame and whither was its blasting heat directed?

We have heard much of Russia in the last thirty years, but in the main of modern Russia only. Of old Russia, the Russia of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, where the roots of Russia lie deep, there is little reading to-day. Alexander Gwagninus and Paulus Oderbornius we may reasonably leave unopened.

Even Samuel Purchas found in them nothing but "huskes, shels and rumours." But the close-packed stories of Giles Fletcher and Sir Jerome Horsey, ambassadors of Elizabeth to Ivan IV., and go-betweens in that astounding passage of love and commerce; of Richard Chancellor, shipmate and co-adventurer of Sir Hugh Willoughby; of George Turberville, writer of verse; of Anthony Jenkinson and of Robert Best; of the Italians, Paolo Giovio, Contarini and Barbaro; of the Germans, Sigismund von Herberstein and Olearius; ending with the stately pages and glorious engravings of Corneille Le Brun; all these paint us the Russian picture and the men who thought and wrought and fought within its frame, in a style of mingled breadth and detail which has lost nothing of freshness or value.

Here are the blood and bones and body of the Russian stock from which derived, sequentially and logically, Orloff and Potemkin, Suvaroff and Koutousoff, Pushkin, Turgenieff, Tolstoy, and Dostoeffsky; but with which half the famous names in later Russian history have nothing whatever to do. And it may well be that the stress that has been lately laid on Russian phenomena, some partly alien, some wholly exotic, both in literature and art, has led to a forgetfulness of the broad human foundation of the Russian people.

The mighty revolution of Peter the Great made rather for division than for union among the Russians. That swashing blow at custom and tradition was too swift to be profound or abiding, and the Master's need for intelligent foreigners to execute his plans sowed germs of a disease which came near to suffocate the healthy national life he thought to establish. Russia was divided and in some sense has remained divided until to-day. There has been a Russia looking out of the window and a Russia inhabiting the house, but the face has not interpreted the body. It has given a false presentment of the truth behind it, and in it alien blood has circulated. To shift the image, the

stream of the people's life has flowed on and in time brought flower and fruit to birth, a generous harvest for the world to wonder at and seek to understand. The true character of the Russians silently enlarged and fixed its type. Late learners they were, but their character was founded deep in sheer simplicity and brought simplicity's attending dangers. For simplicity may most easily be led astray into the perverse paths of cunning and weakness, before it shall find at last its natural and inevitable heritage of sincerity and strength. Russia, half in blindness, half in compulsion, wandered under perfidious guidance from the way, and has to-day regained it.

And so it is that you find the Russia of to-day as has been sketched above. For to-day Russia is getting rid of Germany. Two hundred years of tyranny, of suppression, of paralysis are being realised almost for the first time, and in that realisation are being swept away. Two long centuries of reaction, of intrigue, of exploitation, of perfidy, and of false sacrifice, are going up in gunpowder along the banks of the San. And millions of men feel a new hope in a new heart, and lift undazzled eyes to a dawn which they had grown at last to believe would never break. The mighty work of Peter is purged of the long slow poison it trailed in its traces, and Russia comes to her own at last. And how this fell, this book is written to relate.

For this is not a book on Russia. It is a closely knit political study of two hundred years of Russian history, in which a great people went near to ruin and has won through to power and greatness, and, it may be hoped, to happiness such as it has never known. And the author is perhaps the most competent living man to write it. Of his perfect devotion to the cause of Anglo-Russian friendship I have had the fullest means of judging for near a quarter of a century. Of his utter loyalty and integrity I have had the same experience. His personal acquaintance with Napoleon III. and Bismarck, to mention but two names, adds a quality of immediacy to his work. "No man perhaps has shown

me more kindness," he wrote to me once, " than Prince Bismarck ; though no personal gratitude could prevail against national feeling. And his greatest act of kindness was the knowledge of the realities in politics, which I derived from discussing with him every possible eventuality. Of all my teachers I owe him most." And he added curiously, " My next greatest teacher was Leo XIII." In such a school of high policy, where action alternated with state-craft, M. de Wesselitsky won his fine international position. By his steadfast loyalty to the central idea of an Anglo-French-Russian Alliance, the old historic aim of Peter the Great, he earned and has retained the distinction of the cordial dislike and dread of Germany and Austria, in whose journals he is constantly abused. For this he has his reward to-day.

As President for some fifteen years of the Foreign Press Association in London he has gathered fresh store of influence, respect and affection. England and Russia owe him much, and by this new and most original volume he adds to the debt. It is in the hope of obtaining yet larger recognition for such generous service that I have ventured at the wish of my friend to write this introduction.

HENRY CUST.

RUSSIA AND DEMOCRACY:

THE GERMAN CANKER IN RUSSIA.

RUSSIANS who reside in England are agreeably impressed by the fact that the English political world and English Society of to-day show cordial appreciation of the actual progress of Russia and of her culture in general. They are, moreover, deeply touched by the warm recognition of the efforts of Russia to do her duty by her Allies in the present war. The writer hears, however, that there are earnest and sincere men in this country and in the United States who think she is still the same Russia she was at the time of the Crimean War, and who consider an alliance with her as incompatible with the struggle of Democracy against Military Despotism.

We Russians can confidently leave to our English friends the task of clearing up those misunderstandings and of bringing home to the larger public an up-to-date knowledge of Russia as she really is. This is already being done very ably and consistently in articles and books on Russia, as well as in the daily communications of British correspondents in Russia. The above-mentioned objections, however, touch on a very important question on which it is well worth while to throw a clear and true light, particularly at the present moment,

Is Russia opposed
to liberty and
democracy?

viz., whether there really exists an opposition between liberty and democracy on one side and Russia on the other. An adequate answer to this question cannot be found in one stage or in one feature of Russian development. It must be sought in the whole course of her history, in her fundamental institutions, in her national life and character.

G. DE W.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE RUSSIAN STATE TO THE
ACCESSION OF PETER THE GREAT (A.D. 862-1682).

For many centuries preceding the foundation of the Russian State the Slavs of Russia lived in small, self-governing, mostly agricultural communities, all members of which were free and equal ; they did not owe allegiance to feudal chiefs and waged no wars of plunder or of conquest. All their local affairs were decided, in towns, by the *Vetche*, and in villages, by the *Mir*, an assembly of heads of families. Only in vital matters the decision rested with the elders of the tribe. In the vast Empire of Russia of to-day the great bulk of the population is still living in villages with the same primeval *Mirs*. The life and character of the immense majority of the Russians can hardly be said to have essentially changed through all the evolutions of the Russian history. Left to themselves, the Russians always reverted to the same kind of existence. The necessity of defending themselves against foreign aggression alone produced various superstructures over their primitive society.

Primeval democratic organization of the Slavs of Russia.

Still preserved among the Russian peasantry of to-day.

The appeal made to the Varanger princes was the first step in the way of permanently securing the safety and independence of the country. The state of the Russian Slavs was not, however, substantially altered thereby. National unity came to be represented by the Grand Duke, who, in reality,

Democratic Republics under the leadership of Princes of the House of Rurik.

was only the first among other Princes, and these mostly were commanders of troops and chief magistrates in the local democracies. It was under the nominal rule of Princes that Novgorod and Pskov grew up as prosperous and powerful republics.*

The Mongol yoke
and absolute
power.

The Mongol yoke first introduced the conception, till then utterly unknown to the Russians, of an absolute power as an omnipotent, all-overwhelming force to which obedience was irresistibly due. The Grand Dukes of Moscow, as vassals and representatives of the Great Khans, claimed to exercise the fulness of the authority belonging to their suzerains. At the same time they assumed the part of intercessors for, and defenders of, the people. The marriage of the first independent Sovereign of Russia, Ivan III., with a Palaeologus, connecting the Russian monarchy with the Byzantine tradition, bestowed on it a historic legitimacy, while the sanction of the Church endowed it with a sacred character. The title of Tsar assumed by Ivan IV. gave a full expression to that evolution.

Limitations of
absolutism by the
influence of
aristocracy

For a long time, however, the autocracy of the Tsars existed in principle rather than in reality. Representatives of the people used to be called together in different principalities before the Mongol invasion; this habit was preserved and extended during the Moscow period, and the Zemsky Sabors became a national institution. They were mostly convened in great emergencies and a more direct influence was exercised by a permanent council, the Boyarskaya Douma, a stronghold

* The progress of civilization brought about in large cities marked differences in fortune and position which led to the rise of ancient and wealthy families who strove for influence; yet on the whole, the political and social organization of Russia before the Moscow period remained decidedly democratic.

of the Muscovite aristocracy which grew up simultaneously with the growth of the monarchy.*

Thus Russia, after having, in striking contrast with Western Europe, been from time immemorial a pure democracy, began in the fifteenth century to resemble in political institutions and social organizations West-European countries. But, however necessary this new régime may have been for her national development in that period, it was too uncongenial to her profoundly democratic people. Many Russians, rather than submit to it, preferred leaving the Russia of those days; and these emigrants founded, in lands inhabited by or exposed to the invasion of Tartar peoples, the military democratic republics of the Cossacks of the Dnieper, the Don, the Volga, the Yayik (Oural), and the Terek.

Disatisfaction of the masses. Emigration and foundation of the Cossack Republics.

In their struggles with the boyars the Tsars leant on the other classes, and the stronger-willed among them showed great solicitude for the welfare of the people at large. Ivan the Terrible, who was trying to crush the boyars completely, not only convened the Zemsky Sabors, but allowed elected representatives of the middle and lower classes a share in juridical functions and administrative duties. He granted also charters of self-government to many peasant communities. Notwithstanding the outbursts of his wrath directed against the boyars,

* When Moscow became the centre of national life, wealthy and influential personages from all parts of Russia, accompanied by numerous followers, began to gather there, entering the service of the rulers of Moscow and actively working for the unification of Russia. The position of the boyars (lords) of Moscow was raised thereby to a high eminence, still more increased by their being also joined by princes, descendants of Rurik, who had lost their principalities and were content to become Moscow boyars, retaining only their princely title. This aristocracy differed, however, from West European in being dependent on service to the State, and not on feudal or territorial position.

but reaching occasionally whole towns or provinces, he greatly contributed to the growth in the imagination of the masses of the ideal of a People's Tsar. On the contrary, rulers weak in character or in their position invariably fell under the influence of the aristocracy. Boris Godounoff, who, owing to the circumstances of his accession, needed particularly the support of the upper classes, forbade free labourers to leave on or about St. George's day the estates they were cultivating, as was customary in Russia, thus converting them virtually into serfs. This act, depriving the mass of the people of personal freedom which, unlike the people of Western Europe, it had always enjoyed, led naturally to a tremendous political and social upheaval; one false Dimitri after another, personifying in the eyes of the masses a legitimate as well as a popular Tsar, found strenuous partisans, particularly amongst the peasants and the Cossacks.

While the boyars were intriguing for personal advantage even with foreign enemies the gentry and the upper middle class, animated with ardent patriotism, saved the independence of Russia and put an end to anarchy by electing as Tsar a scion of the universally popular house of the Romanoffs. The rulers of that dynasty had decided popular sympathies and recognized the need of reforms; their intentions, however, were paralyzed by more or less disguised opposition on the part of the boyars.

Popular ideal of a
People's Tsar.

Introduction of
serfdom. War of
the masses against
the upper classes
under the banner
of legitimate
monarchy.

CHAPTER II.

PETER THE GREAT (1682-1725).

Peter the Great,* whose gigantic personality seems to have equalled in strength and energy the whole French Convention, broke down the boyardom, utterly destroying Russian aristocracy, completely subjected the Church of Russia to the State, and, for the first time in Russia, rendered monarchy really absolute. Moreover, under the name of "Reform" he undertook to revolutionize the entire political and social organization as well as the whole national life of Russia. It appears probable, however, that he looked on absolute

Peter the Great's
"Reform."

Absolute power
as dictatorship.

* Peter the Great was the last Russian Sovereign whose official title was "Tsar of Russia." At the request of the "Governing Senate," he adopted, November 2, 1721, the title of "Emperor of Russia" which has gradually, in special clauses of international treaties, been recognized by all Powers. In this way only can a Russian Sovereign be officially addressed.

Ever since, all educated Russians have always spoken of their Sovereign, in a foreign language, as "the Emperor" and in Russian as "*Gosoudar Imperator*" or simply "*Gosoudar*" (Sire). The title "Tsar" is still greatly used by the peasants, who likewise use the word "*Gosoudar*." It is also often used in historical works, in oratory and in poetry.

In Western Europe diplomatists, particularly those who have been in Petrograd, generally use the official appellation of "Emperor of Russia," while with the public the former title, "the Tsar," still mostly prevails, meaning exclusively "Emperor of Russia"; strictly speaking it is no longer correct, for the Bulgarian Sovereign bears the title of "Tsar of the Bulgarians."

Since Alexander I. all Imperial Manifestoes are issued in the name of "Emperor of Russia, Tsar of Poland, Grand-Duke of Finland."

power as a temporary dictatorship necessary for the establishment of the new order of things, destined to assure to Russia her natural place among the Nations. He gave a strong organization and extensive rights to the Senate, which he called "governing" to emphasize its sharing with the Sovereign in the government of Russia. A law passed at the end of his reign, but never applied by his successors, provided for the election of two members for each province who were also to sit in the Senate. And he took up again Ivan IV.'s democratic reforms, giving the people a share in provincial and municipal administration. He also opened up all careers to men of all classes. A man's advancement was in future not to depend on the mere accident of his birth, but on the value of his services to the State.

This last measure certainly was in the interest of democracy, but its benefit, like that of all of Peter the Great's measures, was vitiated by the obligation for the servants of the State to adopt West European dress and manners. As the great majority of the Russians, viz., all peasants and most town-folk, rigidly kept to the traditional customs and national way of living, only a small, passively obedient minority, the new Noblesse, took interest in the State as its governing class; the rest of the population were mere taxpayers and subjects. Many of them, distrusting a Church in subjection to civil power, joined the *Raskol* (Dissent), which then became a form of the national protest against the forced introduction of foreign ways. A rift was thus created in the Russian nation which is only now being filled up.

The greatest ruler of Russia remained unbeloved by his people during his life, and the utility of his "Reform" never ceased to be a matter of discussion. To its artificial character

Compulsory
change of the
forms of life.

Opposition of the
great majority of
the population.

Rift in the Russian
Nation.

are attributed most of the unwelcome sides of the development of Russia during the last two centuries. The worst consequence of the "Reform" was that fatal separation of the new bureaucratic Noblesse from the mass of the people which permitted the domination of the Russian State by a foreign nationality.

Peter the Great's foreign policy was, on the contrary, quite in the national interest, both in what he achieved—the opening up of a window into Europe—as well as in what he attempted, the liberation of Eastern Christians and the alliance of Russia with France and England. In 1698 he clearly saw the necessity of what has been achieved only in 1914! And he was not less wise in his policy towards Germany, that of protecting her minor States against the ambitions of Austria and of Prussia.

Plan of an Anglo-
Franco-Russian
Alliance.

CHAPTER III.

FROM PETER THE GREAT TO CATHERINE THE GREAT

(1725-1762).

Peter's immediate successors unfortunately exaggerated the wrong sides of his home programme, and totally upset his foreign one. The direction of the whole military and administrative machine became concentrated in St. Petersburg, the new capital situated at the extremity and almost out of the Empire—imagine the capital of Great Britain at Land's End!

To this place soon streamed a mass of adventurous foreigners who settled there as in a colony of their own, spreading a foreign atmosphere round an already almost denationalized government. So, as a natural result, the Government ruled Russia from the new capital without any consideration for the needs and wishes of the people, guided merely by the private interest of the momentary holders of power, and sometimes even by their enthusiastic devotion to the interests of a foreign country.

They were enabled so to act owing to the indifference of the masses who regarded the "reformed" State as unholy, and limited their relations with it to a sullen obedience to all its commands which could not be eluded. The new Noblesse, unsupported by the people, was of necessity subservient to the Court and particularly to the dominant faction of the moment.

Russia ruled by
cosmopolitan
coterie regardless
of the wishes of
the nation.

Only in one instance did the democratic spirit of the nation show itself even in "reformed" Russians. When the St. Petersburg government, in imitation of Prussia, tried to create a class of large landowners on the basis of the right of primogeniture, and enacted a law according to which a man's whole estate passed to his eldest son, the Russian Noblesse never applied it and persistently demanded its abolition until the government saw itself compelled to give way on that point to a feeling which was quite unanimous.

The great Peter, in revolutionizing the whole structure of Russian life, needed above all clever and precise men to carry out his will unhampered by any connection with the order of things he was resolved to destroy. He found them at first chiefly in foreigners and, after the conquest of Esthonia and Livonia, availed himself particularly of the services of the German barons of those provinces who were accustomed from their birth to rule over a subject race. He never meant to bestow on them any privileges over Russians, and was making hasty efforts so that Russians might acquire in great Western centres all the knowledge he wished to see applied to Russia. Nothing could have been further from Peter's thoughts than granting to foreigners, and least of all to Germans, a predominant position in the Empire. Notwithstanding this, various factors inevitably led exactly to such a result.

German barons of
the Baltic
Provinces.

Intermarriages with members of German dynasties brought to St. Petersburg German princes and princesses with their suites, and gave to a great extent a German character to the Russian Court. Many of the Baltic barons settled likewise in the capital of the Empire which they considered themselves to be called upon to rule. Thither flocked from all parts of Germany men whose title to nobility was small or doubtful ;

German princes
and princesses.

many of them, even, were but simple adventurers. They were attracted by the great resources of Russia which an almost German Court held at its disposal, and they often obtained most unexpected prizes.

Members of German learned and teaching professions, following in the wake of princes and nobles, came to Russia and acquired highly privileged positions. The Russian Academy of Sciences became a German institution, so much so that, up to quite lately, it published its works in German. It never concealed its hostility towards Russian scientists, and boycotted the most eminent among them. It refused admittance in its midst even to Mendeleeff. When the latter came to Oxford in 1894 to receive the highest honours from the University of Oxford, he was there often referred to as a Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. On one occasion he told the writer (who accompanied him there) that, as a matter of fact, it was the only academy in Europe of which he was *not* a member. The favour shown to German schools in Russia, and their growing prosperity, for a long time contrasted strongly with the many restrictions placed on Russian schools, and the very scanty funds which the Russian Exchequer, up to the present reign, found possible to devote to them.

It would be too long to enumerate all the privileges enjoyed by Germans in every profession and trade in Russia, many of which were still preserved till the outbreak of the present war. Some are continued even at this day. As a remarkable example of them the following may be quoted. The writer, when residing in Germany in the eighties, witnessed the universal outburst of indignation there on account of Russian Jews having petitioned the Russian Government for permission to own chemists' stores in St. Petersburg, then an exclusive

German immi-
grants of the
upper and middle
class.

Privileges of
Germans in
Russia.

privilege of Germans. German writers and speakers appealed to the Jews of Germany to require from their co-religionists in Russia that they should abstain from such a "revolting" attack on the "rightful" possessions of Germans in Russia.

The influx of Germans was so great that, in consequence of intermarriages with them, a considerable part of the Russian Noblesse had German blood in their veins. And the same was the case with the Russian *intelligentzia* and the upper middle class in St. Petersburg. If the language of the cosmopolitan society in the new capital did not become German, it was chiefly due to the fact that the German princes and nobles of the eighteenth century spoke French among themselves. With them, however, even a foreign language served as a vehicle for national thoughts, while the adoption of it by the Russian ruling class consummated their denationalization. Acquaintance with French literature inspired, in truth, in many Russians interest in and sympathy with France, but did not exercise any influence on the policy of Russia, the Court and Government remaining more or less greatly Germanized. The use of a foreign language in society and at home by all families of distinction, or pretending to be such, had the effect of widening more than anything the gulf between the rulers and the ruled. Foreign observers, even so late as the end of the last century, noted with amazement that, in administrative departments and other public institutions, courteous attention was paid to all foreigners, as well as to Russians who spoke a foreign language, while those who spoke the language of the country were treated with contempt.

While society was becoming cosmopolitan, the Court and diplomacy, the army and higher administration grew more and more to be a private domain of the Germans. They were

Russia, ruled by Germans, becomes a Germanic power serving German national aims.

filling up all the most important and advantageous posts, and always pushed forward other Germans who received every preference over Russians. Ruled thus by the Germans, the Russian Empire was practically a Germanic Power whose forces were principally employed to serve Germany and Germanism. And the German yoke proved to be harder and more deeply harmful than the Mongol.

German terror.

It reached its climax when the Empress Anna (1730-1740) entrusted with absolute power her German favourite, Biron, who introduced a régime of terror against all Russians suspected of disliking German rule. He created a special inquisition, invented tortures, and was the first to make extensive use of banishment to Siberia.

It was enough to bear the reputation of being independent in character or of having national Russian feelings to ensure becoming a prey to the spies and agents of the Teuton tyrant. The meekness with which the Russians submitted to an anti-national persecution in their own country can be understood only by remembering that it was exercised chiefly on a denationalized class who had lost the confidence of the people, who did not see much difference between being oppressed by foreigners or by their own estranged countrymen.

Russian reaction
under Elizabeth.

There was a kind of reaction against the exclusive domination of the Germans under the Empress Elizabeth (1741-1762),* but it was only a superficial one. The persecution of Russians as such ceased; and they were again admitted to higher posts in the administration. But no serious measures were taken to dislodge the Germans from the many privileged

* Elizabeth died on December 25, 1761 (O.S.), which in the 18th century corresponded to January 5, 1762 (N.S.).

positions they had possessed themselves of, or to counter-balance their influence at Court and in the government. Russia's foreign policy continued to be determined by one of the two rival German factions at Court, one Austrian, the other Prussian. Elizabeth favoured the former and made war on Frederick II. The St. Petersburg Germans, who already saw in that King the restorer of the ancient power of Germany, were entirely for Prussia. They were gathered round Elizabeth's heir, the Duke of Holstein, a German in his feelings and an enthusiastic admirer of Frederick, who openly declared he valued his commission in the Prussian Army higher than the Imperial Crown of Russia. On ascending the throne as Peter III. (1762) he immediately gave back to Frederick II. East Prussia, Brandenburg and Pomerania, which had been conquered by the Russian Army, then occupying Berlin. He did not ask for any compensation or guarantee for the future, and even placed his army in Prussia under the command of Frederick. The latter recognized that he had been saved by Russia from utter destruction, but showed his gratitude in his own way. Before even the end of the Seven Years' War he sent emissaries to instigate the Khan of the Crimea to invade Russia.

Boundless devo-
tion of Peter III.
to Frederick II. of
Prussia.

CHAPTER IV.

CATHERINE THE GREAT (1762-1796).

Russian national
revival under
Catherine.

Catherine II.'s reign constituted a more serious anti-German reaction. Russia's foreign policy became as a rule independent of the Germanic Cabinets and pursued purely Russian aims. The recovery of the shores of the Black Sea was an historical achievement as essential to the existence of the Russian Empire as was that of the shores of the Baltic. In the Army and the administration Germans were no longer favoured at the expense of Russians; the foremost generals and statesmen of Catherine bore Russian names. She won the enthusiastic loyalty of the Noblesse, which in her reign ceased to be mere bureaucracy. She extended the privileges granted by Peter III. in the Charter of the Noblesse. The nobles were given a certain share in the management of local affairs in the provinces. Provincial and district assemblies of the Noblesse were the first deliberative bodies of the reformed Russia; their presidents, the Marshals of the Noblesse, were the first elective, non-bureaucratic, high functionaries of the Empire. Catherine gave also municipal self-government to larger cities. She went even much farther. Under the name of the "Commission for the framing of laws," she convened an assembly elected in the whole Empire in which all classes were represented. That assembly met in 1767, twenty-two years earlier than the French States-General convened by

Her liberal
reforms.

Louis XVI. It was not, however, given to the "Commission" to become a starting-point of the constitutional development of Russia. The spirit of independence evinced by its members impressed courtiers and bureaucrats as being dangerous to their privileges. Under their influence, Catherine, though she largely availed herself of the legislative work of the Commission, never summoned it again.

Russian writers, comparing Catherine's reign with those of her predecessors as well as of her successors, regard it as an era of national revival. This is, on the whole, true. Catherine consistently strove to feel and to act as a Russian, though she was not altogether free from the influence of her German blood and education. In spite of her relations with French philosophers, she was, in her inner policy, mostly carrying out German ideas. Her constitution of the Noblesse as a class of privileged landowners was an imitation of the Prussian "Adelstand"; and the Assemblies of the Noblesse were copied from the "Landtage." The organization of the trades' corporations and of the municipal administration was also on German lines.

Reforms
influenced by
German ideas.

She had a clear perception of the necessity of emancipating the serfs, yet she did not attempt to carry it through. As she owed her throne to her popularity with the Noblesse, and particularly the officers of the Guards, on whose further support she relied, Catherine could hardly undertake against the wishes of the nobles a reform so deeply affecting their interests.

Not only did she not abolish serfdom, but she even extended it to parts of Russia where it was not known. The result was similar to that of the introduction of serfdom by Boris Godounoff—a terrible insurrection in which peasants and

Catherine inaugu-
rates German
colonization of
Russia.

Cossacks thronged to the banner of a false Peter III., in whom they once more imagined they saw the incarnation of their old dream of a People's Tsar.

While the position of the Russian agriculturists was rendered still harder, favours were lavished on German colonists called in by Catherine to settle in Russia. Every one of them received 60 *dessiatines* (about 160 acres) of the best land, and every colony large pasture grounds and woods. They were, moreover, exempted from all taxes and duties, even from military service, and were granted complete self-government. Absolutely useless to Russia, those colonies formed advance guards of the German *Drang nach Osten*.

Partition of Poland
the most fatal
consequence of
German influence.

The most fatal instance of the German influence on Catherine's policy was her listening to Frederick's proposals concerning Poland and her consenting to its partition. It is true she annexed provinces originally Russian and mostly inhabited by Russians. Nevertheless, the participation of Russia in an act of unjustifiable violence against a Slavic Kingdom bound more strongly than anything the policy of Russia to that of Prussia and Austria. Every time that Russia appeared inclined to form friendships with Western Powers, the Germanic Cabinets appealed to the solidarity among the three partitioning States. They even arrogated to themselves the right to object to any treatment of the Russian Poles which might encourage their national aspirations. No other act of the St. Petersburg government proved more helpful to Germany and more detrimental to Russia.

Turkish wars
unite the Noblesse
and the people in
the struggle for an
ideal.

Catherine's wars with the Turks produced quite a different effect. They not only secured for Russia her natural frontiers in the South, but also gave her the right to protect the Eastern Christians. which equally gratified the sentiments of

both the westernized Noblesse and of the masses faithful to the ancient Muscovite régime. These saw in the struggle against Infidels a defence of their own faith and a liberation of their co-religionists. These campaigns were the first action of the reformed State which the people could understand and sympathize with. They opened the series of Russian Crusades, and began to unite the severed parts of the nation in fighting for the same ideal.

Catherine systematically encouraged Russian language and literature, stimulated Russian national feeling and manifested her pride in being a Russian Sovereign. Of all the reigns of the St. Petersburg period hers was the most liberal up to that of Alexander II. and the most national up to that of Alexander III. Above all she knew how to inspire daring enterprise, persistent efforts and boundless devotion to the throne and the country, which led to feats of heroism and self-sacrifice filling the Russians with confidence in their own Empire and nationality.

CHAPTER V.

PAUL I. (1796-1801) ; ALEXANDER I (1801-1825).

German domina-
tion restored.

Catherine the Great seemed to have clearly traced for her successors the main lines of their right policy. The fact is the more astonishing that they adopted just the reverse. Her death was immediately followed by the restoration of the German domination over Russia, not in sooth in the crude form of Biron's tyranny, but in a more subtle one, penetrating the Russian State deeper than ever before, and determining the whole foreign policy of Russia for ninety-five years, from the accession of Paul I. to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance by Alexander III.

Alexander I.'s
policy determined
by his predilection
for Germany and
friendship with
the Sovereigns of
Prussia.

Paul I.'s reign was particularly remarkable for its tendency to reverse whatever had been done under Catherine. The hopes of Russian Liberals were set on his heir, who appeared to be destined, not only to continue Catherine's reforms, but also to satisfy the aspirations of all lovers of progress. Cautious men even apprehended the radicalism of a revolutionary's pupil.* In the opinion of the talented historian who threw more light than any other on Alexander I.'s personality (the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch), he was a great ruler, but *not* for Russia. Most unfortunately he neither understood Russia, nor liked anything Russian. And he had a strong

* Alexander I.'s tutor was Laharpe, who afterwards, as a Jacobin Member of the French Convention, voted for the execution of Louis XVI.

preference for everything German. Loving humanity above all, he saw its highest expression in Germany, by promoting whose interests he believed himself to be working for the greatest good of mankind. He was, besides, bound by ties of intimate friendship to King Frederick William III. and Queen Louisa of Prussia, the object of the one platonic affection of his life. The vows he exchanged with them were in his eyes more binding than his duty to his own country. The consequence of that state of mind were fatal to himself as well as to Russia.

Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch, in publishing Alexander I.'s private correspondence with his sister and political confidant, the Grand Duchess Catherine, showed that at Tilsit Napoleon decided to wipe Prussia out of the number of independent States and offered Russia for her frontier the line of the Vistula and that of the Danube. Alexander refused both ; the former because he wanted above all to preserve Prussia, and the latter on account of his promise to Prussia not to annex the Danubian countries. Napoleon consented, "out of regard for the wishes of the Emperor of Russia" to preserve the existence of Prussia, but was unable to understand a Sovereign caring more for the interests of a foreign country than his own. He, therefore, suspected Alexander of fundamental hostility against himself, and of deep designs against the French Empire. Their friendship was thus undermined and a conflict became inevitable. Yet while Alexander was, for the love of Prussia, staking Russia's existence in the war with France, Frederick William, in letters full of most abject flattery and humility, was imploring Napoleon to give Prussia the Russian Baltic Provinces !

His sacrifice of essential interests of Russia in order to save Prussia.

But even his friend's shameful betrayal had no power to

change Alexander's heart. After expelling the French and their German Allies from Russia, he at once undertook a war for the liberation of Germany; and at the Vienna Congress insisted above all on the aggrandisement of Prussia. Later on, he founded the Holy Alliance, which practically amounted to Russia's assisting Prussia and Austria in the satisfaction of their ambitions.

On German advice Alexander renounces the idea of granting a constitution to Russia.

His predilection for Germany and the Germans influenced also the whole of Alexander's home policy. In the earliest years of his reign he was determined to grant a most liberal constitution to Russia. A Committee of young men of his age enjoying his particular confidence sat under his presidency in the Winter Palace elaborating such a Constitution. As is seen from the journals of that Committee, the Emperor's great apprehension was the weakness of the future opposition. Early wars for the sake of his German friends, his absorbing interest in Prussia and the influence of his German advisers deterred him from giving a practical shape to the constitution. German-Russians shared most of the important posts in Russia with Prussians specially invited by Alexander I. The great Prussian statesman, Stein, banished from Prussia on Napoleon's demand, exercised, as long as he stayed in Russia, a strong influence on Alexander's mind; he was particularly instrumental in bringing about the war of 1812. To be a German, under Alexander I.'s reign, became more than ever the surest way to every honour and distinction. The famous general, Yermoloff, asked by the Emperor what reward he would like to receive for his great services, replied:—"To be promoted German; rewards would then follow of themselves."

To be promoted to be German the highest favour in Russia.

Yet in one year of his reign Alexander I. showed himself

at one with his people and worthy of his great talents. That was during Napoleon's invasion in 1812. Although almost all the States of Europe, England and Sweden excepted, sent their armies to join the French, and in spite of Napoleon's occupying Moscow, Alexander firmly refused all proposals of peace, and abode by his decision to fight on till the last enemy had left Russia. The desecration of Russian Churches and the destruction of Moscow moved the Russian people to the innermost depths of their hearts, and roused them to wonderful efforts which immensely contributed to the complete victory of Russia.* It was generally expected that after that war Alexander I.'s chief care would be to reward the Russian people for their sacrifices by granting them at last the free institutions he had been preparing for them, as well as by devoting all his thoughts to the welfare of Russia.

Unfortunately he was again diverted from it by his solicitude for the cause of Germany and especially of Prussia ; and his German friends and advisers made every effort to dissuade him from applying his liberal principles to Russia proper. Yielding to their representations, he contented himself with giving free institutions to the frontier provinces of the Empire inhabited by non-Russian populations. Out of the provinces conquered from Sweden, which under Swedish rule never had any autonomy, he created the Grand Duchy of Finland, gave it a liberal constitution,† and even annexed to it the

Free institutions
and autonomy
given to non-
Russian provinces
of the Empire.

* It is interesting to remember just now that the population of the invaded parts of Russia soon discovered the difference between "real French" soldiers and their German auxiliaries whose rapacity and cruelty knew no limits.

† As a matter of fact, that constitution benefited chiefly the Swedish Noblesse which dominated Finland, and Swedish remained the only official language there till Alexander II.'s reign.

province of Vyborg, till then united to Russia, inhabited partly by Russians and situated almost at the gates of the Russian capital.* Out of the Polish provinces which the partition had given to Austria and Prussia, and of which Napoleon had formed the Duchy of Warsaw, Alexander created the kingdom of Poland and endowed it also with a liberal constitution, which, however, as the great majority of the people were serfs, gave citizen-rights to the Noblesse alone. He intended, moreover, to go much farther in alienating Russian territory, viz., annexing to Poland not only Lithuania, but also White Russia and Little Russia on the right bank of the Dnieper, which had belonged to Poland, although the Poles were in a small minority there. He renounced it only in consequence of a pressing appeal of the great Russian historian Karamzin, who persuaded him not to sacrifice to non-Russian minorities in those provinces the great bulk of their population, which was Russian in race, creed and traditions. The privileges of Esthonia, Livonia and Courland were also extended so as to assure them full autonomy. So the non-German natives were delivered up to the tender mercies of their German oppressors. Alexander, it is true, emancipated the serfs there, but he allowed the barons such an influence on the framing of that measure that the liberated serfs were deprived of the land they had been cultivating and continued to be subjected to their masters, getting nothing of freedom except the naked name.

European Liberals always warmly approved those acts of Alexander I. and regretted that not all his intentions were carried out. They evidently were not aware that those rights

* That act of Alexander I. inspired a writer in the Literary Supplement to the "Times" with the reflection that there would be few Irish home rulers in Great Britain if Ireland began in Surrey.

and liberties benefited only small privileged minorities at the expense of the people at large. Alexander I.'s German advisers inspired him with the anti-democratic theory that the nationality of a country was to be determined by that of its Noblesse. They intimated, moreover, that provinces with strong aristocratic non-Russian elements ought to receive new privileges as a reward for furnishing the St. Petersburg government with able and devoted agents to assist them in maintaining their absolute rule over Russia proper. That alliance between the denationalized and greatly Germanized St. Petersburg bureaucracy and the non-Russian Noblesse against the Russian People has certainly escaped the attention of Western radicals and democrats who, under the influence of opinions "made in Germany," stood up for a policy directly opposed to their own fundamental principles.

Nationality of different provinces determined by that of their Noblesse.

As to the Russians themselves, Alexander I. limited his reforms to the creation of military colonies which, given into the charge of his all-powerful favourite, Araktcheyeff, became centres of intolerable oppression. Moreover, in the last years of his reign, Alexander entrusted the latter with the exercise of an absolute power over all Russia which Araktcheyeff made use of so harshly and arbitrarily as almost to recall the tyranny of Biron.

The interests of the Russian majority sacrificed to those of non-Russian minorities.

The Russian Liberals, at the head of whom, before his accession and in the first years of his reign, stood no other than Alexander I. himself, could not help feeling deeply discouraged and embittered by the disappointment of their most cherished hopes. They formed secret societies and prepared a revolution, judging the propitious moment to be just after Alexander I.'s demise. Nicholas I. was hesitating to accept the crown bequeathed to him by Alexander I.,

The rebellion of December, 1825

passing over Nicholas' elder brother Constantine. The conspiracy, which spread into the Army, and the attempt at an open rebellion, undoubtedly deserve all blame. The programme of the Decembrists (so-called from the attempt being made in December, 1825, old style) was, however, incomparably more moderate than that of later revolutionaries. Its two chief points, emancipation of the serfs and national representation, now form an integral part of the legal state of Russia.

CHAPTER VI.

NICHOLAS I. (1825-1855).

Nicholas I. shared neither his predecessor's liberal leanings nor his exclusive devotion to Prussia. He put uppermost his own duty to Russia and the interests of the Russian Empire. To his country's and his own misfortune, however, he too was influenced by German ways of thinking and by his admiration for the Prussian State. He considered his chief task was to give Russia the solid Prussian organization, with Prussian rigid discipline and systematic order. Apparently not knowing or understanding enough of his own people, he overlooked the discrepancy between the free and easy-going Russian national disposition and the Prusso-German methods which, excellent in their own place, were on the Russian soil quickly degenerating into soulless formalism. To govern Russia, for her own good, as if she were peopled by Germans, or as if Russians could be turned into Germans, was an undertaking necessarily doomed to failure. Its only effect was to regularize and morally Germanize the St. Petersburg bureaucracy, rendering it much more oppressive.

Nicholas I.'s attempt to organize Russia on the model of Prussia.

Baltic and other Germans, who had been invading all services under Alexander I., increased still more in numbers ; they were considered as the firmest supporters of the throne, deserving greater confidence than the Russians on account of their presumed absolute loyalty and devotion to the

dynasty. Pahlen's and Bennigsen's dastardly murder of Paul I. was wilfully ignored and its very mention strictly prohibited. Nicholas I.'s belief in the superior moral worth of Germans was so strong that he quashed sentences of the Courts against those convicted for fraud because "they being Germans could not have committed such a thing."

Of all the services, the diplomatic was the most thoroughly denationalized and Germanized. That was at first the work of Alexander I. himself, carried on more consistently by Count Nesselrode, foreign minister during the latter part of Alexander I.'s reign, the whole of Nicholas I.'s and the first years of Alexander II.'s. Nesselrode, a German by birth who remained a German at heart, never even learned to speak Russian and knew nothing about Russia. The Russian language was consistently avoided in written as well as in verbal communications at the Russian Foreign Office. Even a Russian name and origin became a drawback in the diplomatic career and a cause for suspicion. This "Russian" diplomacy made a parade of its devotion to the interests of Europe and of the monarchical principle, while practically serving the aims of Austria or of Prussia. It was animated by intense hatred of Catherine's national Russian policy; and one of its oracles, Baron Brunnow, in a Memorial destined to serve as a guide in the study of foreign politics of Nicholas I.'s heir (Alexander II.) subjected all the great achievements of Catherine to severe criticism; her acting independently of Austria and Prussia appeared to him as a betrayal of "Europe." That Memorial exercised an unwholesome influence on Alexander II.'s mind. In accordance with the opinion of Nicholas I. and that of the ruling class, no criticism of the German nation or of the Austrian or Prussian policy was tolerated; not only in the Press,

but even in works of history. Germany and Germanic States could only be referred to with unqualified praise as bulwarks of order and strongholds of the monarchical form of government.

There existed, however, one question of foreign policy which irresistibly appealed to the feelings of all Russians and about which the "reformed" classes as well as the popular masses were equally in earnest. This was the fate of the Eastern Christians, whom every Russian thought it was Russia's duty to protect and to liberate. And even the most Germanophil rulers of Russia shared it themselves, and were on that point, at least, more or less at one with their people. German-Russians and the cosmopolitan "Russian" diplomacy had, therefore, to bow down to the inevitable; reserving to themselves to limit, in practice, the working out of the policy imposed upon them. At the St. Petersburg Foreign Office, the Asiatic Department, which included the European Near East, differed from the rest in so far that the Russian language and Russian thought were admitted there. And Russian Consuls in Turkey performed their duty of protecting Ottoman Christians with a devotion even to the sacrifice of their own lives. All the higher diplomatic posts, however, continued to be filled up by Germans or Germanized Russians.

National Russian
policy in the Near
Eastern question.

The above explains the independence from German influences shown by Nicholas I. in the course he adopted in favour of revolted Greece. To the great anger of Vienna and Berlin he brought about a rapprochement with England and France; a tentative Triple Entente, for a single day transformed into an alliance, equally glorious for the three Navies, the day of Navarino (October 20, 1827). The Entente, however, broke down immediately afterwards; England and France did not

One day's Triple
Entente.

see their way to joining Russia in the measures of coercion which she proposed to adopt against Turkey at the beginning of 1828.* Seeing Russia alone, the Porte refused all concessions and declared war on Russia, which nevertheless persisted and, by dint of enormous sacrifices in men and money during a two years' war, succeeded in compelling the Porte, in the treaty of Adrianople (1829), to recognize the independence of Greece. The frontiers of the new State were determined by Russia, England and France in the London Protocol of March 22, 1829. By the same treaty of Adrianople Russia secured autonomy for Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, as well as a confirmation of Russia's right to protect the Christians of Turkey.

Renewal of the
Alliance with the
Germanic powers.

The French Revolution of 1830 and its echo, the Polish Rebellion, led to a new triumph of Germanism in Russia. Believing peace and order threatened by a new revolutionary wave, Nicholas I. renewed his alliance with the Vienna and Berlin Cabinets ; and Nesselrode had a free hand for modelling his action on that of Metternich. By an irony of Fate it is exactly in the thirties and forties of last century that Russian diplomatists earned the fame of great sagacity and astuteness. As a matter of fact there were hardly any among them who thought or felt as Russians, and their "successes" did not benefit Russia, but rather Austria or Prussia. Their most brilliant achievement, the Quadruple Entente in the Egyptian question in 1840, which separated England from France and

* The popular emotion produced in France by the devastating warfare of Ibrahim Pasha (Mehemet Ali's eldest son) in the Morea induced the French Government to send a corps of troops, which expelled the Egyptians from that peninsula and remained there without taking part in the hostilities against the Turkish army, till the end of the Russo-Turkish war.

isolated the latter, furthered no interests of Russia, but only those of the Germanic States ; and it was paid for by the abandonment by Russia of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (1833),* which had been the nearest approach to a solution peaceful and also satisfactory to Russia, of the question of the Dardanelles.

It must be remembered to the eternal honour of Nicholas I. that, during the revolutionary period of 1848-1850, he supported Prussia *provided only she respected treaties*, and efficiently opposed her attempts to despoil Denmark of the Elbe Duchies and usurp a supremacy over minor German States. The Russian Baltic Fleet, acting together not only with the Swedish but also with that of the French Republic, compelled Prussia to evacuate Schleswig-Holstein and to give up her designs of conquest. He was not less firm in exacting from the King of Prussia the renunciation of the Imperial Crown of Germany, offered him by the Frankfort Parliament, and a return to the constitution of the Germanic Confederation. In both instances the autocratic Emperor acted as a guardian of the independence of small States, as well as of the balance of power in Europe.

Nicholas I. as
defender of small
states and of the
balance of power.

Nicholas I.'s most criticized act, and one of which he himself bitterly repented afterwards, was his saving Austria from disruption by crushing the victorious insurrection in Hungary. Russia received no compensation whatever for her exertions and sacrifices, not even a war indemnity. An excellent opportunity was lost for putting an end to that ramshackle

* That treaty was signed July 8, 1833, when at the request of Mahmoud II., Russian troops were landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus to protect Constantinople against the advance of the Egyptian Army after Ibrahim-Pasha's victory over the Turks at Konieh.

Empire, a private domain of the Hapsburgs who exploited and oppressed different nationalities, exciting them to strife against one another, and who were already planning to extend their sway over the Balkan Peoples liberated by Russia. To be quite fair to Nicholas I. we must add, however, that the Russian intervention saved the Croats and Serbs of Hungary from the war of extermination waged against them by the Magyars.

A combination of various causes, chief among which the over-rating in Western Europe of Russia's power of conquest and assimilation, as well as a total disregard of the national spirit of the Balkan Peoples, both secretly promoted by the diplomacy of Germanic Powers, brought about, at the end of Nicholas I.'s reign, a coalition against Russia. The war resulted, however, in the attainment of none of its objects.

Estrangement
between Russia
and Western
Powers. Prussia
secures the ex-
clusive friendship
of Russia.

England's trade with Russia passed into Germany's hands, and a deep estrangement was created between Russia, on one side, and England, France and Austria on the other, while Russo-Prussian friendship became closer than it had ever been. Prussia's conduct towards Russia differed from that of Austria in form and degree rather than in substance. Prussia made, in 1855, an alliance with Austria guaranteeing her territory against an attack of Russia. Thus Austria could invade Russia without any opposition from Prussia, but should Russia repulse that invasion and attempt to attack Austrian territory, Prussia would make a war on her. Considering that Russia had saved Prussia, not once, but several times, from utter annihilation, her ingratitude was in no way less than that of Austria. Yet while Austrian leading statesmen themselves declared they would astonish the World by their ingratitude, the Prussian Court and diplomacy

knew how to represent their conduct as a new proof of their fidelity to their traditional friendship with Russia. They were promptly aided in deluding the Russian Court and Government by the German-Russian circles in St. Petersburg, supported by the whole St. Petersburg bureaucracy. The elimination of the Austrian diplomatic influence which, directed by Metternich, had successfully rivalled that of Prussia, left the Prussian influence in Russia without any counterpoise. The proverbial luck of the King of Prussia never was better proved, for the Crimean War practically placed the power of Russia at the services of him who appeared as her only friend.

The high-souled, chivalrous and patriotic Nicholas I. died broken-hearted with grief at the failure of his strenuous efforts to assure peace and prosperity to Russia. Not the least painful for him was his inability even to attempt to introduce the one progressive reform he had at heart all his life, the emancipation of the serfs.

Russia was never governed more strictly according to German ideas than under Nicholas I.; and yet that very military, police and bureaucratic régime modelled on Prussia, with Germans in highest favour at Court and occupying most responsible posts in the government, saw a brilliant era of Russian poetry and literature, of Russian music and Russian art, of Russian national culture. A daily Press hardly existed then, books of any importance were few and far between; a censorship, rigorous and suspicious, arbitrary and almost prohibitive, seemed to be there in order to crush all life of the spirit. That notwithstanding, high literary and political talents in considerable number thronged round two or three monthly reviews; and their productiveness was so abundant

The literary movement in Russia. Formation of public opinion in Russia.

and so valuable that it could not be entirely kept down. Between writers and readers was established so close and intimate a connection that it permitted the writers, in terms understood by the readers alone, as in a code language, to convey a clear and full statement of their thoughts. We cannot dwell here on the literary merit of that movement, but we must point to its ultimate victory over the whole system of repression on the part of the Germanized St. Petersburg bureaucracy. A public opinion was created in Russia and its moral power has continuously and rapidly increased.

Westerners and Slavophiles.

Most of the writers belonged to the school of the Zapadniki (Westerners), centred in St. Petersburg, eager to further Peter the Great's "reform," a more complete imitation of Western Europe, its liberties and self-government. But there was another school, the Slavophiles, principally in Moscow, who were conservatives and partisans of Autocracy, which they only wanted to be rendered thoroughly Russian. They advocated a return to the dress and manners, customs and institutions of the Moscow period, the Zemsky Sabors included. They dared sharply to criticise Peter the Great's "Reform" and the whole St. Petersburg régime. The Zapadniki excelled in numbers, as well as in variety of talents. The Slavophiles were characterized by depth of thought, purity of life, high moral standard and ardent patriotism. Nevertheless, these loyal and devoted monarchists were more suspected and disliked by the Germanized bureaucracy than even partisans of republican and socialistic ideas. Placing their class interests before those of the monarchy whose defenders they claimed to be, the St. Petersburg bureaucrats seized every opportunity for persecuting the Slavophiles and hardly tolerated their existence. The time was evidently not yet arrived when

Russians could freely assert their nationality in their own country.

Both schools, however, had one trait in common, springing from the primordial democratic character of the Slavic race—love of the people, heightened by the consciousness of the great historic wrong suffered by the free labourers of Russia at the hands of Boris Godounoff currying favour with ambitious nobles. Economists, historians, philosophers, novelists set to work to persuade society and the government to remove it.* The mind of the Nation was made up on that subject before the first step was taken by the government.

Work of both schools in favour of the emancipation of the serfs.

Nicholas I.'s reign witnessed the beginning of another remarkable evolution, the appearance in public life of Russified Germans who brought to the service of the Russian nationality the energy and efficiency of their own race. They were chiefly offsprings of marriages in which either parent was orthodox, in which case the Russian law prescribed that children should belong to the Orthodox Church. Theoretically that law appears to infringe absolute religious freedom, but practically it proved to be of great benefit to Russia. The same result was often attained, however, by Russian education and surroundings. Under a Germanized government men of German descent enjoyed greater freedom of action and could more easily stand up for Russian national rights. The first Slavophil Committee was founded by Hilferding. The most ardent Slavophil of the seventies was Orest Miller. Many bearers of German names in our days not only do not yield

Russified Germans.

* The name of one man deserves to be mentioned here, who helped more than any other to attain that end—I. S. Tourgheneff, whose "Memoirs of a Sportsman" played, in the emancipation of the Serfs in Russia, a part similar to that of Mrs. Beecher Stowe's "Uncle Tom's Cabin" in the emancipation of the slaves in America.

to full-blooded Russians in their devotion to Russia, but are conspicuous by their Russian national spirit. The late M. Hartwig earned the boundless hatred of all the Germans by his strenuously carrying out Russian national and Slavophil policy in the Balkans, and was called in Berlin and Vienna the most dangerous and fanatical Panslavist. The writer could quote, from personal knowledge, many other German-Russians who are fighting in the forefront for Russia and Slavdom.

CHAPTER VII.

ALEXANDER II. (1855-1881).

Alexander II. was a Liberal in the purest and highest sense of the word, a believer in the goodness of human nature, a humanitarian, full of generous impulses. His liberalism, if less radical than was Alexander I.'s in the beginning of his reign, was much deeper and firmer. He certainly loved Russia and the Russian People above everything, and was a true Russian himself, combining the firm as well as the soft sides of the Russian national character. He was animated by an ardent longing, not only to carry out the reform most desired by his father, but to regenerate Russia altogether. He would have made an ideal Russian ruler had he not also had the unfortunate trait of both his predecessors, the belief in the superior civilizing mission of Germany and the trust in the friendship of the Hohenzollerns.

Alexander II. as
a great Liberal
Reformer.

The emancipation of the serfs was effected by Alexander II. in spite of the opposition of the new aristocracy, the descendants of the favourites and great bureaucrats of the preceding reigns. The Emperor's strenuous insistence and unshakeable determination finally prevailed over all obstacles. The great measure was open to many criticisms from the juridical, economical and financial standpoint. To conservatives it appeared too radical and too democratic, almost revolutionary, as giving no compensation to serf-owners for the loss of the

Emancipation of
the serfs.

gratuitous work of their serfs, and as expropriating them in order to give a part of their land to the emancipated. Liberals, on the contrary, complained of the insufficiency of the land allotted to former serfs and would have liked to see it given them without indemnifying the landowners.* However, by the passing of that law the wrong done to the peasantry by Boris Godounoff was made good, and the descendants of the wronged were compensated with land, the acquisition of which was facilitated to them by the government. That one reform practically amounted to a peaceful revolution, and laid a basis for a reconstruction of the whole fabric of the Russian State. After the emancipation was passed in 1861, Russia was already quite different from what she had been during the Crimean war. Those who take her as being the same now are more than half a century late in their European history.

The second great reform was that of Justice, the creation of Courts of Justice independent of the executive power. Recognizing that the high cost of justice placed it at the disposal of the rich alone, the Russian legislator strove to render justice accessible to the people at large, thus giving that reform a decided democratic character. The third not less great reform was the introduction of a new way of local self-government, the creation of the *Zemstvos*, provincial and district representative assemblies, elected by all classes

* Contemporaneously with the emancipation of the serfs in Russia took place that of the slaves in the United States of North America. Although it would not be fair to overlook the greater difficulties of the latter owing to the race question, one cannot but be greatly impressed by the Russian measure, much more radical than the American, being achieved without any serious perturbation, not to speak of a civil war. The emancipated slaves numbered about $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions; the Russian serfs were 22 millions belonging to the Noblesse and 21 millions owned by the State, about 43 millions in all.

of the population. They were a continuation and an expansion of Catherine's Assemblies of the Noblesse. And just as the latter prepared men for the work of the Zemstvos, these formed other men for the work of the State Douma.

Among other reforms should be mentioned an extension of municipal self-government ; an abolition of all censorship for books and of a preventive one for newspapers, a beginning of the freedom of the Press ; also a greater religious tolerance, a milder treatment of the Russian dissenters (*raskolniki*). The writer cannot here omit pointing to one of the grossest errors concerning Russia consistently imposed by the Germans on public opinion in England, the pretended intolerance towards West European Churches in Russia. Since the beginning of the St. Petersburg period all West Europeans were treated in Russia as superior beings, and enjoyed all freedom which was denied to Russians ; their churches were much more independent of the State than the so-called " dominant " Church of Russia. The Lutheran Church, to which belonged the German Noblesse of the Baltic provinces as well as a large part of the St. Petersburg Court and bureaucracy, was practically the most privileged church in Russia. Restrictions were imposed upon that part of the Roman Catholic clergy which had a leading rôle in Polish political agitation ; but real intolerance was practised only regarding Dissenters from Russian Orthodoxy.

Greater religious tolerance.

The Dissenting movement originated in a protest against the " correction " of the copies of the Bible and of the rites of the Church of Russia to bring them into agreement with the Orthodox Churches of the East, and had grown enormously since the Westernizing " Reform " of Peter the Great. It constituted, as we remarked before, a form of national protest

against the compulsory imposition of foreign ways of life. The German rulers of Russia saw in it a direct opposition to their power over that country, and Biron instituted against those sectarians a systematic persecution. Catherine, very tolerant herself, introduced as much tolerance towards the Dissenters as was compatible with the spirit of the Russian upper classes at the time. Their treatment became harder again under Nicholas I., but Alexander II. rightly saw in the Dissenters Russians misled by false doctrines, but who had faithfully preserved their nationality and loyalty towards the throne and the country. When he had, partially at least, eased their condition, a deputation of the Old Believers told him :—" In the innovations of Thy reign we see the good old times so dear to us coming back again." That was the best testimony for the character at once liberal and national of Alexander II.'s home policy. Nothing proves better the misleading influence in Western Europe of the opinions " made in Germany " than, on one side, the acceptance as truth of the perfectly false accusations of intolerance towards West European faiths and, on the other, a total absence of sympathy with the victims of real intolerance.*

Largely democratic reforms were introduced by Alexander II. in Finland, making the Finnish language, spoken by the people, to be the official language of the country, beside the Swedish spoken by the upper classes, and giving the Finnish people in general equal rights with the Swedish minority. Reforms very favourable to the Poles were planned and were being applied, when most unfortunately an insurrection stirred

* The only well-known writer who showed a sympathetic interest in Russian Dissenters was Hepworth Dixon in his books on Russia.

up from abroad by the enemies of both Slavic peoples defeated the work of Alexander II.

The reforming Emperor intended to crown the edifice by the grant of a constitution. Just at the moment when he was going to carry out his plan he fell a victim of a most undeserved catastrophe. Never was there perpetrated a crime more abominable and more stupid! It put the clock back in Russia for a quarter of a century.

It is painful to pass from a survey of Alexander II.'s home policy to that of his foreign one. Only one common trait unites both, purity and generosity of motives. His foreign policy was guided by his general German sympathies, by his deep regard for and complete trust in his maternal uncle, William I. of Prussia, and also the influence of Bismarck with him and his Chancellor, Gortchakoff. The Prussian sympathies of the Court, of the diplomatic service and the higher bureaucracy had a similar effect. The almost universal disapproval of that policy by Russian public opinion, as well as the misgivings of clear-sighted statesmen and writers, were utterly disregarded. Yet each of the three great successive stages of the rise of Prussia was not less directly harmful to the vital interests of Russia, than to those of Europe in general.

The conquest of Schleswig-Holstein changed the balance of power on the Baltic, depriving Russia of her predominance there and preparing that of Germany. The exclusion of Austria from the Germanic Confederation destroyed the balance of power within the latter, which both the greatest rulers of Russia, Peter and Catherine, were so anxious to preserve, and it necessarily made the minor German States dependent on Prussia. At the same time, Austria's exclusion from

Alexander II.'s foreign policy guided by his German sympathies and his trust in William I.

Prussian successes most injurious to Russia's vital interests.

Germany, together with the loss of her possessions in Italy, made her extension into the Balkans the one aim of the Austrian policy, placing Austria in an irreconcilable antagonism to Russia and obliging her to seek an alliance with Germany. Finally, the German victory over France led to a definitive unification of Germany under Prussia, and to the restoration of the German Empire with its traditional claims of universal supremacy, as the heir of the Roman Empire.

The clearest interest and duty of the Russian Government was to have prevented those achievements, or at least provided each time some compensations or guarantees with the view of maintaining the balance of power in Europe.

It seems incredible, but is nevertheless true, that Alexander II. zealously supported and enthusiastically rejoiced over them. In 1870, particularly, it was Russia's threat to attack Austria, if she joined France, which made Austria, and through her Italy also, renounce their alliance with Napoleon III. The conditions imposed on France appeared, in truth, too hard in St. Petersburg, but Bismarck won Alexander II.'s consent by assuring him that otherwise William I. would lose his throne and monarchy would be imperilled in Europe. William I. spoke the truth when, on the conclusion of peace, he telegraphed his thanks to Alexander II., declaring that "after the Almighty, it was to him that Germany owed most of her success."

The Russian government demanded no equivalent for the immeasurably valuable assistance they had lent to Prussia. Alexander II., Gortchakoff and all the friends of Germany in St. Petersburg firmly believed, however, that William I. and Bismarck would seize the first opportunity for testifying,

William I. acknowledges the decisive value of the support of Russia.

by deeds, the boundless gratitude they expressed so often and in such glowing terms. The Balkan crisis of 1875-78 seemed to afford the best opportunity for doing so, and it looked as if Bismarck had indeed resolved to avail himself of it in order to pay off Germany's debt to Russia and thus to secure her friendship for ever. The confidence of the Russian governing circles in Bismarck's devotion to them had grown to such an extent that they applied to him for advice in all important matters and he became the actual leader of the foreign policy of Russia.

Russian Court and Government convinced that Germany seeks an opportunity to prove her gratitude.

Bismarck's real aims and the origin of the Balkan crisis were well known to a few observers (among them the present writer), who repeatedly warned Russian diplomatists against their delusions, but could not make them realize the unpalatable truth. In May, 1875, Bismarck, greatly impressed by the rapid recovery of France after her terrible disaster, decided to strike a new and more crushing blow. The usual Press campaign was particularly violent, and was accompanied by military preparations of an undoubtedly threatening character. All Europe was alarmed, and Alexander II., as a proved friend of Germany, advised William I. to abstain from an aggression which could not be approved by Russia. His advice was supported by similar representations of the British government. Both Russia and England had, to a different degree, been favourable to the unification of Germany, but neither of them wished to see a further diminution of France. Bismarck stoutly denied having ever thought of attacking France. Struck by the wholly unexpected concurrence of England and Russia, he resolved to prevent a repetition of it in future by pushing Russia into a war which would at once weaken her and place her in opposition with England.

Real origin of the crisis of 1875-78.

Russia and England prevent Germany from attacking France in May, 1875.

The story of the German policy in 1875-78 is most instructive, and ought to be told in detail. The writer hopes to be able to do it in another work ; here he is only going to point to the most striking facts which have never yet seen the light of day. Bismarck went on preparing the war he held to be necessary for rendering Germany supreme in the same unscrupulous manner as William II. in our days. The interests of all other Nations and of Humanity itself, as well as all moral principles, were entirely subordinated to that one goal. The only difference lay in the sense of realities, and in the adaptation of means to ends, which characterized Bismarck's action and ensured its success.

As the Turkish misrule gave a permanent ground of discontent to the Christians of Turkey, it was easy to stir up among them an insurrection which would involve the Balkan States and, later on, Russia. Bismarck chose for that purpose Herzegovina, peopled by war-like tribes and contiguous to Austrian territory. He imparted his ideas to high personages of the Vienna Court. Francis Joseph's approval was easily obtained, and the execution was entrusted to an ambitious Slav general, Roditch, governor general of Dalmatia. The plan was kept secret from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Andrassy, who, at that epoch, like most Magyars, was opposed to any increase of the Slav population of the Hapsburg monarchy. The first rising occurred among the protégés of Austria, the Catholics of Herzegovina, while the Orthodox majority of the country was rather unfavourable to the movement. They were finally drawn into it ; Bosnia followed their example ; and a year later, Serbia and Montenegro joined the brethren of their race.

The Turks, as usual, committed many atrocities, not only

Bismarck decides to weaken Russia by war and to place her in antagonism to England.

Germany chooses to stir up insurrection in Herzegovina.

in Herzegovina and Bosnia, but also in Bulgaria. Public opinion was stirred up in all Europe, and nowhere did the indignation rise higher or find a more eloquent expression than in England. The Russian people, who were always deploring the oppression of Eastern Christians and longing to free them from it, were most impressed by Gladstone's thundering indictment against Turkey, and felt they could no longer remain passive. Numerous volunteers of all classes went out to help Serbia, and those of the peasantry, when asked why they were doing it, mostly answered:—"To suffer for Christ!"*

The Russian government, taken unawares by these events in the midst of vast reforms necessitating financial operations whose success depended on the maintenance of peace, were most unwilling to go to war. They asked the advice of—Bismarck. This candid friend expressed his astonishment at the hesitations of the Russian diplomacy, criticized its indecision, and ridiculed its fear of England and Austria. He positively promised that Germany would prevent any intervention of other Powers, and would see to it that Russia should not be despoiled of the fruit of her efforts.† Later on he saw in the continued moderation of Russia a doubt of Germany's and his own loyalty. He told d'Oubril:—"A repetition by Germany of the Austrian betrayal in 1855 is unthinkable, particularly when I am at the helm."‡ . . . "It

Unwillingness of the Russian Government to make war.

Bismarck promises Germany's support and ascribes Russia's moderation to doubts concerning his loyalty.

* The writer, who was in Moscow in the autumn of 1876, heard that answer repeatedly from those peasants who had made a vow to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and thought it was still better to go to fight the enemies of Christ. The same religious spirit animates the Russian people in the present war.

† Reports by d'Oubril, Russian Ambassador in Berlin, of December 17 and 23, 1876.

‡ Report by the same of April 6, 1877.

is in the traditions of Austria to keep a dagger in her bosom in order to strike a friend ; it is not Germany who would be capable of such a dastardly policy.”*

Simultaneously he warns Austria against Russia and promises Germany's support to Austria.

It is now known from Austrian, as well as from German authentic sources that, simultaneously with those assurances, Bismarck was warning the Vienna Cabinet of the hostile designs of Russia against it. He even informed Andrassy that, asked by Russia about Germany's attitude in case Russia attacked Austria, he firmly declared Germany would defend the Hapsburg Monarchy with all her forces.

Success of Bismarck's plans. He promises Russia to get the Berlin Congress to ratify the treaty of St. Stefano.

Bismarck's plans succeeded perfectly. The Russian Government were drawn into the war they neither planned nor wished. England stifled her generous impulses under the presumed necessity of defending her Empire from an imminent danger. Austria, tempted by an eventual gain of territory, fell under Germany's influence. However, Russia, after lavishly shedding the blood of her sons and squandering her material resources, just then most needed for her internal regeneration, overcame all obstacles set to her Crusade. She compelled Turkey to accept the resurrection of Bulgaria, the independence of Roumania and of Serbia, and the liberation of Macedonia.† The Powers who “put their

* Report of April 20, 1877.

† Article 2 of the treaty of St. Stefano says :—“ La Sublime Porte reconnaît définitivement l'indépendance de la Principauté du Monténégro.” The Turkish occasional pretensions to a suzerainty of Montenegro never having had any real foundation whatever the definitive renunciation to them by the Porte was not counted as a gain by either Montenegro or Russia, and had only a retrospective value. The crushing by Russia of the Turkish power of resistance paved the way to a subsequent interpolation in the treaty of Berlin of a clause in favour of a rectification of the Turco-Greek frontier which was subsequently developed into a cession of Thessaly to Greece by the treaty of Constantinople, May, 1881.

money on a wrong horse" threatened to make war on Russia unless the treaty of San Stefano was revised. Bismarck won Russia's consent to it by promising so to direct the discussions of the Congress as to secure the recognition of the stipulations of that treaty. The belief in Bismarck's devotion to Russia was so absolute at the St. Petersburg Court that one of the highest personages of Russia wrote to the Emperor:—"Bismarck is sure to arrange everything in the best way for us, if only Gortchakoff does not spoil it."

Bismarck arranged, indeed, everything in the best way for—Germany. Liberated Macedonia was given back to Turkey, the lot of her Christian inhabitants was much worsened, and for 35 years more the unfortunate province constituted the chief centre of unrest in the Near East and a source of everlasting conflicts among the Balkan States as well as among the Great Powers. Germany alone profited by it, directly or indirectly frustrating every scheme of reforms, and appearing in the eyes of the Turks as their only friend. Bosnia and Herzegovina, who had struggled and suffered most of all, were placed under the Austrian yoke, more dangerous for their religion and nationality than was the Turkish. Austria became a Balkan Power and strove to dominate the whole Peninsula; acting henceforward in an irreconcilable antagonism to Russia, she was thus made entirely dependent on the support of Germany and had to submit to her leadership. England and Russia, who had seemed at one moment to be quite united in their sympathy with the Eastern Christians and in their condemnation of Turkish tyranny, became more than ever estranged the one from the other, and their co-operation in any question was for a long time rendered impossible. Russia, considerably weakened

The work of the
Berlin Congress.

and exhausted, could no more dispute German pre-eminence in Europe.

Cruel disappoint-
ment of
Alexander II.

Alexander II. naturally experienced a most cruel disappointment. When, at the beginning of the Oriental crisis, a Russian statesman cautiously uttered some doubts concerning the German policy, the Emperor, looking painfully surprised, asked him :—“ Do you doubt my uncle’s honour ? ” The alliance of Germany with Austria unmistakably proved those doubts were quite justified. William I. himself was perfectly aware of the moral value of his policy. He wrote to Bismarck that to conclude an alliance against Alexander II., after all he had done for Germany, was “ manifestly dishonourable.” Nevertheless, he finally concluded it.

A high dignitary of the Court of Berlin, very attached to William I. and hostile to Bismarck, confided to the writer the “ true reason ” of that Emperor’s consent to the alliance against Russia. That consent was won by Bismarck’s quoting the words of Frederick II. :—“ We Kings of Prussia sacrifice to the State, not only our life, but also our honour.” The old courtier added :—“ that was of course an argument which the Emperor could never withstand.”

CHAPTER VIII.

ALEXANDER III (1881-1894).

Alexander III. ascended the throne under the immediate impression of his father's terrible fate. It was but natural that he should, first of all, seek to consolidate the lawful order and to strengthen the power and efficiency of his Government. Bismarck knew how to profit by that state of things, and offered a renewal of the Russo-German friendship on the basis, not of sentiment, but of practical usefulness ; explicit agreements were to secure precise mutual advantages. He succeeded, moreover, in throwing the responsibility at the Berlin Congress on Gortchakoff, who had "misunderstood him and thwarted Bismarck's disinterested efforts to serve the Russian cause." Nothing could be cleverer and more advantageous to Germany. Her treachery to Russia was thus condoned, and she was credited with having repaid the services of Russia and so owing her no gratitude in future.

Strictly conser-
vative Policy.

The apparent frankness and outspokenness of Bismarck's proposals appealed to the straightforward and practical mind of Alexander III., and the Germanophil elements in St. Petersburg enthusiastically supported the return to the old policy. The year 1885 saw the restoration of the Alliance of the Three Emperors, the greatest and last success of Bismarck. The true character of it was best described by German comic papers which represented Austria as a

The Alliance of the
Three Emperors
restored.

tame elephant decoying a wild one, Russia, into the custody of a keeper, Germany. Bismarck's plan, as the writer, residing in Berlin, 1885-92, was able to ascertain from authoritative German sources, was to push on Austria to the Ægean Sea and Russia towards India, then to compel France to enter a customs Union with Germany and to become her political vassal like Austria. After years of the struggle between the Elephant and the Whale, the Central European Federation, led by Germany, would have imposed peace on them, receiving compensations from both sides.*

Alexander III.
recognizing
Bismarck's
deceitfulness
concludes an
alliance with
France.

But Alexander III., while faithfully fulfilling his part of the agreement, clearly saw through Bismarck's fallacies and became fully aware of the deceit practised by him on Russia. He took courageously the only counter-measure possible, he concluded an alliance with France. Those only who realized the strength and subtlety of the German influences at the Russian Court and in the Russian Government could duly appreciate the greatness of Alexander III.'s achievement. He was enabled to perform it by his remarkably clear though limited vision of Russia's position and interests, and by his indomitable fortitude in carrying out every decision once adopted. He never hesitated to sacrifice his preferences and prejudices to the good of his country. A firm believer in autocracy he nevertheless became the sincere ally of a republic. The Germans and Germany-serving elements in Russia bowed

* To the writer's private knowledge, during the short existence of the renewed Alliance of the Three Emperors, Bismarck made a series of attempts to embroil Russia with England. On the occasion of the Penjdeh incident in 1885, he urged Russian diplomatists to an energetic action. In 1886 he strongly advised the Russian occupation of Bulgaria, etc., etc. Once, in order to overcome the objections against a strong action, he offered the support of a German army corps.

down to the inevitable, hoping to paralyse the new policy in execution and gradually to restrict its scope and significance. Soon after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance, one of the highest and most influential Russian diplomatists tried to impress on the writer that in his work as a publicist, he "ought to be guided by that truth, that the interests of Russia and Germany were identical."

The state of mind of the St. Petersburg governing circles, as described above, accounts for the astonishing fact that during the reign of the monarch whose general policy was opposed to Germany, the latter made great progress in two most important directions. In the middle of the eighties, just when Bismarck was once more drawing the Russian diplomacy into Germany's orbit, the first German military and financial missions went to Turkey; and early in the nineties, the foundation of the German domination was laid on the Bosphorus. In the same period, the German colonization of Russia was conducted on a large scale. German syndicates, directed by the German Government, were buying land in Russian Poland as well as in Western and Southern Russia, which they were afterwards reselling to German farmers. The influence of the St. Petersburg Germans, adroitly assisted by the German diplomacy, contrived to keep the Russian Government in ignorance of so methodical an activity, which was only disclosed by a private investigation organized by a Russian monthly review (*Roussky Vestnik*). The figures published by it, showing the extent of that pacific invasion, produced a great sensation at the moment, but were soon forgotten by the public, while the Germanophil forces in Russia succeeded, first in delaying and then in shelving all the measures intended to defend Russia against a disguised German conquest.

German penetra-
tion into Turkey.

German coloniza-
tion in Russia.

Against those colossal achievements of the German policy we may record one modest, but important victory of the Russian cause over Germanism in Russia. The extraordinary privileges granted by Peter the Great to Esthonia and Livonia, and conceded also to Courland on its annexation by Catherine, made of those provinces with their own laws and administration, and German as the official language, an *imperium in imperio*; they secured to the German Noblesse an absolute control over the non-German native population. Those privileges needed confirmation by every succeeding sovereign, generally given on his accession. Alexander III. declined to confirm them. This national and democratic policy was the first act to lighten the terrible tyranny of the German barons over the people of those provinces.

In Russia proper, the chief aim of Alexander III.'s ministers was to fight the revolution, with which object they tried to curtail some of Alexander II.'s reforms and placed the emancipated serfs under the guidance of special functionaries, thus separating them from other classes and keeping them in a state of half freedom. There are reasons, however, to think that Alexander III. was personally not at all opposed to free institutions when once public order and the reign of law were permanently secured. From statesmen who had approached him, the writer learned that the Emperor felt a warm interest in old Russian institutions, the Zemsky Sabors included. It was very unfortunate he did not find among his advisers anyone who could give him that full information about them he desired to possess.

Still, the Russian people judged Alexander III. aright, considering him a thorough Russian. It was generally known that he consistently refused to give preference to Germans over

Russians in the military and civil services. He even began to Russify the Russian diplomatic body ; he rendered the Russian language obligatory in its domestic correspondence. He made himself greatly popular with the masses by abolishing Peter the Great's ordinance forbidding servants of the State to wear the beard which he himself allowed to grow. Also he modified the uniforms of the army, making them resemble national costumes still in use with the masses. Such changes may seem superficial to those unacquainted with Russia, but they had a deep meaning, constituting concessions to the sentiments of the great majority of the people, or rather a return of the Monarch to the unaltered popular way of thinking. We saw how Peter the Great caused a rift in the Russian nation by his compulsory introduction of foreign manners. Alexander II. did a great deal towards healing it by his great democratic reforms. Alexander III. added to them the adoption by the Sovereign and Dynasty of some of the people's ways. And his pure and happy family life set a fine example to Russian Society, and endeared him to the Russian people. He was the first quite national Emperor of Russia, and could almost be regarded as the founder of a new and purely national Russian Dynasty.

Return to national
Russian customs.

Alexander III. as
the founder of a
purely Russian
Dynasty.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PRESENT REIGN : PERIOD OF CONSERVATISM
(1894-1905).

The present reign in Russia, so full of startling and decisive events, must be regarded as an era of fulfilments and consummations. The two last reigns brought Russia to a turning point. Problems dating from the dawn of Russian history and vital for the Russian Empire came to the front and had to be solved without any further postponement. Aspirations of the Russian people, invariably manifested through the thousand years of its existence, had to be at last satisfied, if Russia was to fulfil her destiny. Alexander II.'s reforms, leading to a reconstruction of the State and society in conformity with the democratic character of the Slavic race, had been abruptly broken off, and a reactionary current had set in favourable to the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy and the privileges of the ruling circles. Alexander III.'s policy, to free Russia inside and out from a more or less disguised German yoke, was as yet uncompleted. Hostile forces were working to replace that yoke. A failure to take up again and completely to achieve both tasks would have exposed Russia to either revolution or reaction, and helped the hereditary enemy of Slavdom in his designs to bring the only great Slav Power under his sway.

Significance of the present reign in Russia.

Such were the difficulties and perils which awaited at his accession the twenty-six years old Autocrat of Russia. The first period of Nicholas II.'s reign, 1894-1905, appeared chiefly as a continuation of his father's rule. Alexander III.'s great achievement, the French Alliance, was faithfully maintained, and his general policy, of peace abroad and order at home, carefully pursued. A strong minister, Plehve, made a determined attempt, on the one hand to stamp out the revolutionary agitation by force, on the other, so to amend and regularize the bureaucracy as to enable it to go on governing Russia without the co-operation of independent social elements. This attempt proved a decided failure. The systematic repression of the revolutionary movement by force alone, though it greatly restrained its outbursts, did not succeed in eradicating it. On the contrary, that agitation, till then confined to groups of intellectuals, penetrated into the working classes of large cities and even, by forged proclamation in the name of the Tsar, incited the peasants to burn the landlords' mansions and seize their property. The Zemstvos and the municipalities, the propertied and the professional classes, unduly restrained and interfered with in their activity, were dissatisfied and had no means of defending their interests and combating the revolution. The bureaucratic machine was already in an advanced state of deterioration, and private interests dominated the bureaucrats. Members of influential coteries, at the Court and in the administration, feeling themselves threatened in the enjoyment of their illegal privileges, were trying betimes to get for themselves, to the detriment of the State, as many private advantages as they could. Corruption of all kinds and on a large scale was alarmingly on the increase.

1894-1905.
Continuation of
Alexander III.'s
policy.

Germany, bent on making Russia dependent on her pushes Russia into perilous adventures.

The efforts of the privileged to retain the power in their hands were systematically encouraged and assisted by German influences within and without. The policy of the Berlin Government towards Russia underwent a radical change after the unification of Germany. Weak Prussia needed a strong Russia to protect her and to help to attain her aims of aggrandisement. But, when, thanks to the unselfish services of Russia, Prussia had absorbed Germany, she wanted her late protector to become her satellite, and in order to ensure this, considered it necessary first to weaken Russia by pushing her into hazardous and disastrous undertakings. She could succeed only by the help of those irresponsible coteries whose influence she was trying to maintain.

As Germany herself now cast eyes on the Near East she tried to divert Russia's attention from it and direct it towards the Far East. Her efforts were crowned with success, and she could undertake the construction of the Bagdad Railway and establish her exclusive influence on the Bosphorus. German diplomacy hoped also to utilize the German leanings of St. Petersburg in order to effect, with the help of Russia, a rapprochement with France. During the South African War the Berlin Cabinet, and the Emperor William himself, strained every nerve to form a coalition against Great Britain. The pronounced friendliness of the Emperor Nicholas towards the latter disconcerted those schemes.

Anti-British coalition defeated by the refusal of Russia to join it.

German pledges to Russia during the Japanese war

Lack of space does not allow us to relate here the German wiles in order to involve Russia into a war with Japan. After succeeding in that, Germany gave Russia an apparently generous guarantee of the safety of the Western Russian frontier and an assurance that she would not undertake anything in Europe to the disadvantage of Russia. Immediately

afterwards, however, she began to press for the conclusion of a Russo-German treaty of commerce; and during the negotiations, the German Government made capital out of its "generosity," frequently hinting it would be put to a severe test should Russia not prove her gratitude by far-reaching commercial concessions. All discussion of that treaty pending its conclusion was suppressed in the Russian Press, and it was only last year, at the approach of negotiations for a new treaty, that competent Russian specialists were at last able to point out the one-sided charges it imposed on Russia, so that in fact the treaty amounted to the payment of an immense tribute. Notwithstanding this Germany began, just before the conclusion of the Peace of Portsmouth, a diplomatic campaign against France and, as is known to the writer from the best German sources, contemplated sending an ultimatum to Russia, asking if she intended to maintain her alliance with France, in which case, Germany, "to her sincere regret," would be obliged by military considerations to direct her main forces first of all against the Russian frontier. It is possible that those intentions, and the unguarded state of the frontier in consequence of the German pledges, accelerated the end of the war with Japan.

Deeply laid plans were methodically pursued for strengthening German influence in Russia. Systematic colonization of the frontier provinces of Russia was hurriedly pushed forward. The greatest progress was made in the Vistulian region (Poland), in the Baltic provinces and in South Western Russia. Russian authorities in Poland had been persuaded that in favouring German immigrants they were acquiring for Russia quiet and obedient subjects, able and willing to defend her against Polish nationalism. Those immigrants have proved

Extortion of economical advantages making the treaty of commerce equivalent to a Russian tribute to Germany.

Projected attack on France and ultimatum to Russia in 1905.

The German Government attempts a systematic German colonization of Western Russia.

and are, indeed, proving their ability and willingness to serve the German armies in the present war. They furnish them with their best spies, and are appointed to administrative posts in the parts of Poland occupied by the Germans.

In 1905 a violent insurrection of the Letts, natives of Livonia, shattered the domination of the German barons and would have put an end to Germanism in the Baltic provinces, had not the Russian Government taken to heart the appeals of the perishing barons and sent a strong force which saved them from annihilation and replaced the Lettish and Russian population under their sway. The dangers which had threatened Germanism gave a pretext for an agitation in Germany, and large funds were collected there "for restoring *Deutschthum* in the German Baltic provinces." Farmers and labourers, foresters and inspectors were sent hither from Germany, and the German hold on the East Baltic coast has become firmer than ever. There are certainly Baltic Germans bound by interest and sentiment to the Russian Empire; many of them are in the Russian Army valiantly fighting the Germans; and at the beginning of this war their number was increased by volunteers. It is perplexing, however, to know that other Baltic Germans have joined the German Army as volunteers; in some cases, brothers are fighting against each other.

In January, 1910, the present writer, in an interview with the Prime Minister Stolypin, called his attention to the efforts of Germany in that part of Russia. Stolypin replied that he recognized the gravity of the matter, but there was a much more actual danger with which the Government had to deal, the immigration of Germans into the South-Western provinces, which took the form of a systematic invasion. A bill had

German domination in the Baltic provinces.

Stolypin on the urgent necessity to stop the peaceful German invasion of Western Russia.

just been framed and would immediately be presented to the Douma, which, Stolypin was confident, "would vote it without delay on account of its extreme urgency." That bill never even came up for discussion in the Douma, and was withdrawn in 1913 by Stolypin's successor. So great was the German influence with every party in the Russian Parliament as well as with the Government. This war and the voice of the Press compelled the bureaucrats to undertake the framing of a new bill against the passage of landed property into German hands. The accounts of it given in the newspapers show, however, how ineffective it was, and even now such a bill is meeting with great opposition* on the part of German-Russians, Germanophiles and pacifists who, in spite of the treachery of German colonists in Poland still believe in the harmlessness of the German colonization.†

But it is not only to help a military invasion that the German Government was directing the stream of emigration towards Russia. Their deeper plans have been revealed to us by Pan-German writers. To take one out of many, Karl Jentsch‡ advised, in 1905, a systematic buying up by German syndicates of large estates of the Russian nobles, as well as of the peasants' communal land. The syndicates were to resell their acquisitions to "skilful and intelligent German farmers who would scientifically cultivate them with cheap Russian labour." Then German tradesmen would settle in small towns and make

German colonization as a means of subjecting Russia to Germany

* Since the above was written the firmness of the Government, supported by a unanimous public opinion, succeeded in breaking down that opposition, and a decree has been issued considerably limiting the possession of land in Russia by Germans. The Press generally approves it, but points at several loopholes favourable to Germans.

† After this was written it became known that an attempted Turkish raid, guided by German officers near Akerman on the Bessarabian coast, found a warm welcome from German colonists in Bessarabia.

‡ In an article entitled "Grossdeutschland" in the "Zukunft" September, 1905.

them prosperous centres of German culture. Manufacturers would follow and found great factories, utilizing on a large scale cheap Russian labour. Thus, wrote Jentsch, "the vast territory the Russians are unable to cultivate themselves would receive its full value, and the regenerated Russia would form an appendage to the Central European agglomeration of States directed by Germany. The latter would discover the reward for her work of implanting culture in Russia by finding in it an immense field for the activity of the surplus of her population, which would not be lost for the Fatherland as when it emigrates to America." The Pan-German writer laid down a characteristic condition for the full success of the Germanization of Russia. "The German landlords must be much less harsh and imperious than were the German barons of the Baltic provinces."

It is now quite certain that this plan was deliberately adopted by the German Government, and that a great part of it has already been carried out. German colonists in Russia who wanted to return to Germany were told by German Consuls it was their duty towards their German fatherland to remain in Russia and work there for the German cause. Encouraged by the amazing passivity of the Russian Government as well as of the Douma, the Germans have been gaining ground in Russia with every year. A new and powerful impulse was given by the passing in the German Reichstag, in 1911,* of the bill "on the Conservation of the German Nationality," completed in 1913 by another bill "on the double subjection"

Germany's attempt to gain the allegiance of all subjects of other States of German descent.

*During the discussion of that law in the Reichstag in 1911, attempts were made in a Russian newspaper to point out the danger arising from it for countries with descendants of German immigrants. Neither the bureaucracy nor the public paid any attention to the question.

which permitted the "recovery" of that Nationality to all descendants of former German subjects by means of a private "declaration" to German Consuls. The significance of that law has just been explained by a Frankfort Lecturer on International Law, Strupp, a recognized authority in Germany on that matter.

In an article entitled "The Juridical Status of Germans who are British Subjects," Herr Strupp asserts that "If a German is also a British subject, that circumstance has no influence on his rights and duties as a German subject." "Such an 'Englishman' (Strupp uses the inverted commas with an evident intention) is bound to fulfil his military duty in the German Army. He cannot evade paying German military taxes. In return for that, he enjoys the fulness of the rights of a German subject; in particular he is not to be interned in concentration camps, is not obliged to register himself at the police station, etc." But, if he refuses to join the German Army fighting against the country of which he is also a subject, he is—according to Strupp—liable to be treated as a deserter and a traitor.

German jurist's view of the duty of such double subjects to serve Germany even against their other country.

With a marvellous unanimity the Governments of all the countries possessing such double subjects have ignored and continue to ignore the law whose effect essentially concerns them all. It is alleged that hundreds of thousands of former German subjects have made the "private" declarations required from them and are secretly fulfilling their duties towards their recovered Fatherland. If that were verified many otherwise obscure events in the present war would be explained. However important that matter is for all States with Teuton subjects—and it seems to become very prominent in the United States just now—it nowhere could attain the

Many subjects of other States become secretly German subjects

Particular danger of German colonies in Russia.

importance it has in Russia, where the Germans have, in the last two centuries, been the ruling race and where their influence still permeates the whole administration of the State, as well as that of most of the great financial and industrial companies. Every day since the war began new facts come to the surface which, long known to many, could not be publicly stated till now. For instance, we are learning that in the self-governing German colonies in the South of Russia everybody is in possession of guns, the permission to have them having been easily obtained from the local authorities, while all such requests of Russian peasants were stubbornly refused as dangerous. We know also that colonies of late years have invariably been established at important strategical points, junctions of railways, etc. Under the pretext of shooting parties, German colonies are visited by German officers who generally have in their suite some relatives of the colonists. Such was the practice for a number of years in the Caucasus, where every spring saw the arrival of German officers, with their *Jaeger* (huntsmen) whom they generally left behind them in those colonies, and arrived next spring with another set of *Jaeger*. Those officers were most interested in shooting near the Turkish frontier which they often crossed to visit Turkish officers. The Russian authorities saw no harm in that, and were only anxious to give the Germans every facility for their sport or study. The inhabitants of the Caucasus who related this to the writer pledged him to secrecy concerning their names, the revelation of which would have for consequence their being hunted down by those authorities.

Connivance of
the Russian
administration.

The same passive attitude, if not connivance, of the administration has till lately been seen in their not noticing

how many of those German colonists, Russian subjects, were going to serve their time in the German Army, thus getting imbued with German patriotism. On the other hand, German subjects, selected for their ability by their Government, were sent to Russia to seek employment in the State military factories. They were forbidden to *write* about their observations to Germany and even to take notes in writing, but were bidden to keep all knowledge in their memory and to come to Germany to report verbally every two or three years.

Immeasurable services to Germanism were rendered by German schools, justly named "fortresses of Germanism" in Russia. German-Russian and purely Russian pupils were equally inoculated there with a worship of Germany and a contempt for Russia. It is most remarkable that the higher Education authorities, often vexatiously interfering with the Russian schools, allowed the fullest liberty to the German ones. And these were all supported by the *Deutsche Schulvereine* in Russia, acting on the instructions and with material assistance of the Central Direction in Berlin.

German schools in Russia, fortresses of Germanism.

The *laissez aller* system applied to those *Schulvereine* formed a striking contrast to the continuous hampering of the work of the patriotic Russian Societies of the so-called "Slavophiles." The most brilliant success of the German policy and the most colossal deceit ever practised in Universal History was the labelling of those poor Slavophiles with the name of Pan Slavists, thus rendering them an object of distrust and suspicion in Russia and of fear and hatred* in Western

The Germans invent Pan Slavism deceiving with it the Russian Government and European public opinion.

* The unfavourable reputation of the Slavophiles in this country is the more astonishing in view of their warm admiration for England, whom they have always extolled as a perfect national State. And there exists in no language a more glowing description of England than in the poem of the greatest Slavophile leader, Khomiakoff, "Marvellous Island."

Europe. As a matter of fact, there have never been Panslavists in Russia, and the very name has never been used there except in quoting foreign writers. No Russians ever wanted the reunion of other Slavs to Russia, and no agitation in that sense has ever been practised in Slavic lands by the Russians.* What the Slavophiles wanted was to preserve the minor Slav nations from Germanization. It is that purpose of theirs which rendered them so criminal in German eyes; and German cunning succeeded for a long time in making Englishmen and Frenchmen see in those defenders of small nations the worst enemies of civilization and humanity. The Slavophiles had, in truth, another and still more important aim, the defence of the Russian nationality and the liberation of Russia from the German yoke. Their last great leader, Ivan Aksakoff, told the writer that "the Slavophiles were unjustly criticized in Russia for taking too great an interest in foreign Slavs; they did it chiefly in order, by emphasizing the Slav origin of the Russian people, to attain its national independence at home."

Yet another contrast was formed by the absence of any restraint of the anti-Russian agitation of Pan-German organs in Russia and, up to 1905, the strict and meddling supervision of the national Russian organs of the Press. The chief Pan-German newspaper in Russia, organ of the German Embassy, the "Deutsche St. Petersburger Zeitung," enjoyed

* Panslavism in a theoretical sense existed among the weakest and most oppressed Slav peoples, *e.g.*, the Slovaks of North Western Hungary. Austrian Slavs in general used to visit Russia and complain of their sufferings and persecutions, trying to excite sympathy in the Russians. They often deplored the apathy of the Russian public, which they did not succeed in rousing sufficiently. Such was the only "Panslavist" agitation which has ever existed.

even the privileged publication of all official announcements, which was equivalent to a large subsidy. The ardent German and openly anti-Russian tone of that paper in the first two months of the war compelled the Russian Government to decide on the suppression of it from January 1 (14) 1915, leaving it three months to continue its insolent activity when the smallest similar offence by a Russian paper would have led to its immediate suppression.

Pan-German
agitation in
Russia.

Generally speaking, since the restoration of the German Empire, the Pan-German agitation in Russia has greatly increased, while the leniency and even connivance of the administration continued unchanged. The national feelings of Germans in Russia, whether subjects of Germany or of Russia, has also grown and become more self-conceited (with the laudable exception always of the quite Russified German-Russians, particularly those belonging to the Orthodox Church or married to Russians). The erection of a statue to Bismarck in the German cemetery in Moscow proved to be a constant stimulus to Pan-German truculence. Spoiled by continual favour and impunity, the Germans feel themselves to be a superior race in Russia. That is so in the highest degree in the Baltic provinces, in which even since the beginning of this war, patriotic Russian demonstrations have been dispersed as offensive to the German Noblesse; on the same ground, the local Russian and Lettish Press is forbidden to express its feelings. The German language, though spoken by a small minority, is there still the only one used in public life.

Monument to
Bismarck in
Moscow

Russian patriotic
demonstrations
still forbidden in
the Baltic
provinces.

Owing to an extraordinary support at Court and in the Government, as well as to the devotion of all the Germany-serving elements in Russia, the position of the German

The extraordinary
influence of the
German Amba-
sador in St. Peters-
burg.

Ambassador in St. Petersburg had acquired an exceptional importance. A thousand channels brought him every possible information and conveyed his instructions to all parts of the Russian Empire. Under Alexander II., the German Ambassador, prompted, as he asserted, by his personal attachment to the Russian Emperor, reported to him supposed malevolent and traitorous utterances of Russians in high position, who always happened to be unfriendly to Germany. In subsequent reigns the German Ambassador arrogated to himself a kind of censorship over the Russian Press. Every article unfavourable to the German policy was instantly made a subject of complaint, while grossly insulting articles in German newspapers were excused on the plea of the pretended freedom of the Press in Germany. The Russian authorities had grown so anxious to avoid those complaints that they came to regard every public expression of distrust towards Germany or the Germans as reprehensible. When, in 1898, Major-General Zolotareff, professor at the War Academy in St. Petersburg, alluded in a speech to the abnormally privileged position of Germans in Russia, a detachment of gendarmes was at once sent to arrest him, and it was with much difficulty that his immediate chiefs succeeded in having that order cancelled. The distinguished strategist was, however, compelled to leave his professorship and even the Army. The Germans in Russia were evidently above criticism. In 1910, when a lecture on Anglo-Russian Relations was to be delivered at the Political Club in St. Petersburg, though it had no reference to Germany, the German Ambassador tried to have it forbidden, and not attaining that object, warned the Russian Foreign Minister and his Under-Secretary against their attending that lecture. Both

Censorship over
the Russian Press.

Excessive regard
of Russian
authorities for
German suscepti-
bility.

statesmen, who intended to be present, found it more prudent to keep away.

Innumerable were the German diplomatic attempts to influence the Russian Press, directly through cajoling popular writers, and indirectly through disguised offers of money. A considerable income was once offered to a member of the staff of the most influential Russian organ for "watering" the London telegrams of that paper. Its correspondent was himself offered "by his sympathizers" the double of his salary in case he would "give himself rest," that is, cease corresponding. A surer means of influence was, however, found in the propaganda among the Russian conservatives of the "necessity to uphold the traditional Russo-German friendship, in order to save the monarchy." That did not prevent the German Embassy from cultivating intimate relations with Russian revolutionaries, and even from hatching plots which were to spread insurrection in Russia simultaneously with the beginning of war with Germany.* They failed only because, on the outbreak of war, those revolutionaries shrank from co-operating with the enemies of their country. Non-Russified German-Russians persisted in their hostility against the national Russian policy and the friendship between Russia and England which it involved. A former Russian Ambassador was so entirely carried away

German diplomacy tries to corrupt Russian Press.

The German Ambassador seeks to attract the Russian Conservatives in the name of Monarchical solidarity.

At the same time he instigates the Russian revolutionaries to rebellion.

* After the destruction of the German Embassy in Petrograd, the only act of popular fury against Germany in Russia, there were found in a room in which Count Pourtalès was said to have indulged in amateur photography, 16,000 copies of proclamations appealing to Russians to rise against the very Government to which the Ambassador was accredited. It is now also authentically proved that the great strikes in Petrograd during the French President's visit last July were instigated by the same Embassy.

by his racial feelings as to dare, at a sitting of the Upper House, after protestations of loyalty to the Sovereign, categorically to blame his foreign policy and boldly assert the only right policy for Russia was that of alliance with Germany!

CHAPTER X.

PERIOD OF PROGRESS (1905-1915).

The first act of personal initiative of Nicholas II. was the epoch-making proposal of the Hague Conference. At the moment it greatly amazed and startled everybody. European Liberals claimed the Emperor as one of themselves and highly praised his grand humanitarian move. Most Governments showed themselves favourably disposed. One, which was nourishing thoughts of aggression, persistently blocked the way.

The initiative of the Hague Conference, the only practical step towards a lasting peace.

The present moment is least propitious for rendering justice to a peace act. Still, one must recognize that the creation of the Hague Court is the only concrete step in favour of peace which has ever been taken, that it has been of practical service in many cases, and that, if as we hope, this war will remove the chief obstacle to a lasting peace, all future development of international relations will have to proceed on the lines of the proposal of the first Hague Conference. The present writer is convinced that, in following in this matter the impulses of his heart, the Emperor Nicholas was giving expression to the innermost wishes of the Russian people who have always been averse from war and in favour of peace. The said proposal was the first of the great acts of the national Russian policy of this reign.

It was but natural that the Sovereign who endeavoured to promote peace amongst all Nations should be anxious to assure it to his own. His liberal and humane feelings, the warmth and sincerity of which always struck those who approached him, found their expression in the Manifesto of 1903, which contained a clear statement of just and liberal principles of government. If they had been taken to heart by the Emperor's ministers and conscientiously applied, many of the subsequent troubles would have been avoided. Unfortunately the bureaucratic clique did everything in its power to prevent their application, supported and stimulated in that disastrous work by German influences in and out of Russia. The decisions of Nicholas II., however, are always deeply matured and inspired by what keen observers of his acts term his "historical sense." This latter assertion is supported by the Emperor's keen interest in history, manifested, for instance, by his patronage of historical research, particularly by his presiding at meetings of the Historical Society. One would probably not err in attributing to the Emperor's ever-growing knowledge and understanding of history, especially of the history of Russia, the deep and lasting character of his decisions. Some of them came quite as a bolt from the blue, and yet, having been the results of a many-sided study and meditation, they remained irrevocable.

Personal views
of the Emperor
regarding home
policy.

Misunderstood
and not carried
out.

The Organic Laws
of October, 1905.

immense improve-
ment in the state
of Russia.

The Organic Laws of October, 1905, have been much criticized by conservatives as well as by liberals, and may be very imperfect; but who can deny that they produced an immense improvement in the state of Russia? They restored, in a form adapted to modern conditions, some of the features of the ancient régime destroyed by Peter the Great. The Council of the Empire, one-half of whose members is elected

by the Zemstvos and the municipalities, is a much improved Boyarskaia Douma, and is more democratic than most of the Upper Houses of Western Europe, the hereditary element being quite absent. The Douma of the Empire recalls the Zemsky Sabor, differing from it by its more democratic character. It offers, indeed, the spectacle of the most democratic legislature in Europe, for in no other have the lower classes such a large number of representatives, many of whom wear the peasants' dress. And it is the only parliament of a great power in which Asiatics and Mahomedans are sitting side by side with Europeans and Christians, enjoying equal rights with them.* Western radicals and socialists who deny or under-rate the magnitude of the change in Russia evidently do not realize that, before the October Laws, the fact of one's being suspected to be a socialist would have been a motive for his prosecution, while now there is a legally constituted socialist-democratic group of Members of the Douma who state their views freely from its tribune. The right of interpellation in the Douma, together with the freedom of the Press, is exercising a most salutary effect on all branches of the administration. Great and small bureaucrats tell with deep sighs their relatives and friends how impossible, owing to an eventual disclosure in the Douma or in the Press, are now become all those illegal favours they used to bestow on them.

Salutary effect of the control of the administration by the Douma and by the Press.

Better control of the administration and the changed spirit of the Government in general account for the reduced interference with private enterprise and business of all kinds. This

* Asiatics and Mussulmans have always enjoyed in the Russian Empire all the rights of other citizens, without any discrimination due to their religion or origin. Mussulman generals commanded Russian troops and an Armenian Loris-Melikoff, was Prime Minister.

allows a greater display of activity, stimulates to more energetic efforts, encourages savings, and has in fact largely contributed to a wonderful economic revival. Russia has not only quickly recovered the losses incurred through a disastrous war and internal troubles, but has attained a degree of prosperity she had never known before.

It is also since the introduction of the new régime that a reform has been brought about of the deepest economical, social and political significance, namely, the passing of peasants from communal to individual land-ownership. When the serfs were emancipated, land was not given to them individually, but to the village commune, an institution the origin of which is hidden in the darkest ages. To most Russians the commune seemed to be an exclusively Russian institution, a part of their nationality. It required a deep conviction of the necessity of the reform to undertake it, and a clever handling to carry it through successfully. The commune was not abolished; its members were only allowed to choose between remaining in it or becoming individual landowners, in which case the State would come to their aid. The immediate consequences of that measure clearly proved its beneficence. The possession of his own plot of land exercises a powerful influence on the peasant; it transforms him into an independent working unit, enterprising, self-controlled and progressive. It is permissible to attribute that reform to the personal initiative of the Emperor, who always shows a warm interest in the welfare of the peasantry, who are by far the most numerous class of the Russian people.

According to the latest information received by the writer from authoritative sources, the peasants, with the assistance of the Ministry of Land Organization, are eagerly, as in Ireland,

Individual land-ownership of the peasants and its salutary effects.

buying up, by mutual goodwill, the lands of the gentry; who now, as they mostly live in towns, have less opportunity to look after their property in the country. A class of small landowners is thus growing up which will constitute a new and important element in the Russian Nation, giving it a decidedly democratic character, recalling that of the primitive communities of the Slavs of Russia.

Further dem-
ocratization of
Russia.

The same Ministry is also managing the colonization of Siberia, making grants of land to such immigrants as are able to cultivate it. The number of these settlers from European Russia of late years annually amounted to half a million; in 1913 it rose to a whole million. Compare the peopling of Siberia with that of another rapidly growing country, Canada, and you find that, while in 1906 the population of Canada was larger than that of Siberia, in 1911 Siberia had already two million inhabitants more than Canada; and the increase has since been maintained. The explanation lies in the proximity to and the quick growth of the population of European Russia, but also in the able and consistent way in which the will of the Emperor is carried out by the Minister of Land Organization, Mr. Krivosheine, whose successful labours are forming a fine page in the history of the Russian administration.

Rapid increase o
population of
Siberia.

The second period of the present reign in Russia is marked in foreign affairs by the completion of Alexander III.'s work in carrying out Peter the Great's plan of an alliance of Russia with France and England, which may be called his Unwritten Testament. The Triple Entente has in the seven years of its existence proved to be the most pacific grouping of Powers which has ever been. It might justly be called the Pacifist Entente. Nothing could, in truth, equal their readiness to

The Triple
Entente.

accept the most fallacious assurances of the aggressors, to overlook facts which gave these assurances the lie, and to make all kinds of concessions, in order to preserve at least a formal peace. It fell to the lot of Russia to surpass even her partners in meekness towards Germany. She yielded, in 1909, to an insolent demand such as Russia had never received from anyone since she threw off the Mongol yoke.* And she patiently bore William II.'s impudent public boastings about Germany's "shining armour." The entirely one-sided Agreement of 1911, by which Russia recognized the Bagdad line as a German Government's undertaking, and pledged herself to build a railway which would facilitate the German competition with the Russian trade in Persia, was a climax of pacifism never before attained by any powerful nation.

The submission of the Triple Entente to Austria's requirements—the creation of the State of Albania and the exclusion of Serbia from the coast of the Adriatic—was the direct cause of the second war between the Balkan Powers. The heightened self-confidence of the Germanic Powers determined them, under a false pretext,† to attempt to subjugate Serbia and to establish their domination over the Balkan Peninsula. Thus it turned out that the very conciliatory and yielding policy of the Pacifist Entente, pushed to an extreme, led to the conflagration which it had been endeavouring by all means

* It has been rumoured that, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers presided over by the Emperor, he alone inclined to resistance, and only reluctantly accorded his sanction to the Ministers' conclusions.

† The fact that both the actual murderers of the heir of Austria were exempted from the capital punishment inflicted on those who were but indirectly concerned in the crime confirms all that was, indeed, widely known before; namely, that the murder was *not* due to Pan-Serbian agitation, but to the divergencies within the Hapsburg monarchy itself and its dynasty.

Germany's insolence and Russia's meekness.

The Germanic Powers encouraged by the concessions of the Triple Entente determine to place the Balkans under their yoke.

to avoid! This had, on the other side, the inestimable advantage of unmistakably showing to the world *who* it was that wanted war and *why* the war was taking place. Germany and Austria became the prey of the gods who blind those whom they wish to destroy.

The declaration of war by Germany brought about a complete change in the attitude of the Russian Government. In rapid succession, one after another, were issued radical decisions of the Sovereign, enthusiastically welcomed by the whole nation. The suddenness of those decisions ought not to induce us to think they were taken on the spur of the moment. They were matured long ago by the Ruler of Russia, and kept in suspense to be applied at the right moment. They all bore a profoundly historic character, and were all based on a thorough knowledge of Russian history; they settled questions which had been pending for over two hundred years. Although universally known, their immense importance renders it necessary to make clear the full significance of each of them.

Turning point in the policy of Russia.

Momentous decisions of the Emperor.

Russia has been at war with Prussia and with Austria alternately; and once, in 1812,* with all the German States together, yet no one of those wars was essentially a Russo-German struggle; the Russians took part in the Seven Years' War only as Allies of one or the other of the chief antagonists, just as in the war of 1812, the Germans acted only as Napoleon's Allies. In most of the wars of Russia against European States, she was allied to one or all of the Germanic

First Russo-German struggle of a vital character.

* The best Austrian General Schwartzenberg with 30,000 of his best troops (the equivalent of which would be now at least 600,000) invaded South-western Russia and advanced on Kieff. His plan made so deep an impression on the Austrian Staff General that it has been adopted for the present Austrian campaign against Russia.

Powers and fought chiefly for their defence or in their interest. Now, for the first time, Russia and Germany are fighting each other in a life and death struggle.

This fact was strongly emphasized by an open rupture between the Reigning House of Russia and the German dynasties who, for over two centuries, had been bound together by many ties of relationship and friendship. All Russians have joyously saluted that event, which puts an end to those real or imagined German influences in the highest circles that had so long been distressing them. The Russian people are now feeling themselves the more closely bound to their national dynasty, and their attachment to it has grown in equal degree.

This freeing of Russia from any regard for German opinion rendered at last possible the declaration of the true Russian national policy. It is that of the so long misjudged and persecuted Slavophiles. The Imperial War Manifesto expressly stated that Russia was about to fight, not for herself alone, but also for our brethren, the other Slavs. Russia had done so several times before, but no mention of it ever appeared in any official document, as the Russian Government, out of regard for Germany, studiously avoided it. The present writer, himself, with many others, heard in October, 1876, in a hall of the Imperial Palace of Moscow, Alexander II. addressing the Moscow Noblesse and praising the Russian volunteers in Serbia "who proved in shedding their own blood their devotion to the Slav cause." The bureaucrats were appalled by the Emperor's address, and, fearful lest the words, "Slav cause," might give offence to Germany, suppressed them in all reports of the Imperial visit to Moscow.

A war for the liberation of all Slavs could not be consistently

Rupture with
the German
dynasties.

National Russian
policy.

Liberation of
the Slavs.

Unity and auto-
nomy of Poland.

waged by Russia while it kept in subjection the most numerous of the non-Russian Slavs. The proclamation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, guaranteeing the Poles national unity and autonomy, is the first step on the path of that liberation. The Slavophiles always advocated the granting to Poland, not only autonomy, but even independence. The Poles themselves, however, are opposed to the latter, for it would involve the loss of the vast Russian market for their flourishing industry, and prove the economic ruin of their country. The great obstacle to reconciliation has ever been the claim of Polish politicians to the provinces which had belonged to Poland before its partition, but where the Noblesse alone was Polish. It appears, however, that the Poles do not pretend any longer to impose their nationality on non-Polish populations. Their representatives in the Douma have declared, without conditions or reservations, that "the Poles will be with the Slavs." The Poles in general decline to put forward any demands as long as this war lasts. It is known, nevertheless, from private utterances of their foremost leaders, that they would be satisfied if all districts with over 50 per cent. of Polish nationality were included in the autonomous Poland.

The heroic conduct of the Poles, who do not shrink from any sacrifice in the defence of the Empire against the common foe, strongly appeals to the Russians. It proves to them that Russians can trust Poles as Poles trust Russians. Both Slav peoples have at last realized that their fratricidal struggle was chiefly fomented by the traditional enemy of their race. All the most offensive measures tending towards the denationalization of the Poles have been conceived and attempted by the German-Russian Governors-General, whose

Russo-Polish
reconciliation
and mutual
trust.

systematic Russification of Poland consisted principally in the plantation of those German colonies which were the vanguard of the German attack on Russia, as this war has convincingly demonstrated.

Loyalty to the Empire characterizes the conduct of all the nationalities, as also of all the parties, in the whole of Russia. However great and seemingly well-founded had been the motives for dissatisfaction on the part of certain portions of the population, they dwindled to almost nothing the moment the fate of the Empire was at stake. The Finns do not form an exception. Finnish volunteers in the Russian Army, and hospitals for wounded Russians, organized by the Finns in Finland, prove that the Finnish people has not listened to a few agitators acting under German influence. This loyal attitude of the Finns will certainly help finally to settle the position of Finland in the Russian Empire satisfactorily for both sides.

All Russian politicians of to-day agree in believing any increase of heterogeneous elements in Russia proper to be contrary to Russian national interest, and in considering the existence of an autonomous Finland and of an autonomous Poland as conforming with that interest. *Therein lies the best guarantee* for the maintenance of those autonomies, as well as against the annexation by Russia of any territories with a non-Russian population.

One of the most popular among the latest Imperial decisions was the Russification of the name of the capital. It symbolized the end of the German domination in Russia and the beginning of a national period of Russian history. But it is only the first step towards the de-Germanization of Russia. To defeat the German armies, to break the power of Germany is comparatively an easier task than to pull out the innumerable

Loyalty to the Empire of all the nationalities and parties in Russia.

Russian politicians opposed to an inclusion of non-Russian populations into Russia proper.

The arduous task of the de-Germanization of Russia.

fangs of Germanism, which had systematically fastened themselves into Russia, like the tentacles of an octopus, clutching its intended prey. One of the leaders of the Russian national thought wrote lately to the writer:—"We are still living in 'Russlandia,' 'Rossia' (Russia) is yet to be created!"

That view is unfortunately justified by the more or less disguised resistance which the intentions of the Government, warmly supported by public opinion, are meeting with on the part of certain bureaucratic, financial, commercial and other circles whose interests have become dependent on the continuation of the German influence. To extirpate the results of the German pacific penetration is not found easy, even in the countries where it has been methodically pursued since the day of the restoration of the German Empire. It must needs be infinitely more difficult in Russia, where that penetration began with Peter the Great's "Reform," and where for more than two hundred years the Germans occupied a predominant position at Court and in the Government, and were treated as a superior race, entitled to every kind of privilege denied to all other peoples of the Empire. Russia can be de-Germanized only by a determined, unrelenting, systematic action of the Government with an energetic organized concurrence of all Russian citizens. The complete de-Germanization of Russia is the only efficient safeguard against a return of the German influence which would endanger not only the national independence of Russia, but also that of all Europe.

Resistance of
Germanized
elements.

A great reform, utterly unconnected with politics, but of a hygienic and sociological character, is exercising just now an immense influence on the economical, political and even

Total prohibition
of alcohol.

military situation of Russia, and is legitimately expected to exercise an ever-growing influence on the destinies of that Empire. In the rescript appointing M. Bark as Finance Minister, the Emperor Nicholas expressed that, on his Majesty's journeys across Russia, he had been struck by the great harm caused to the People by the vice of drunkenness, and that he had resolved that the State should no longer get profit from it through the State monopoly of alcoholic drinks. The prohibition movement had existed in Russia for some time already. Its partisans eloquently pleaded that it was chiefly drunkenness which kept the Russians behind other peoples of Europe, and that it was increasingly undermining their physical constitution and conducting them to economical and social ruin. Everyone agreed about the harmfulness of that national vice, but many practical politicians, Members of both Houses of Parliament and others, argued that the State was not able suddenly to renounce so large a source of income, that a total abstinence could not be observed by the people so much accustomed to the use of alcohol—which, indeed, in moderate proportion, was necessary on account of the climate—and finally, that a rigid enforcement of the prohibition would be difficult to maintain and might excite a dangerous dissatisfaction in the masses. It is hardly probable that the reform would ever have been attempted had not the idea of it suggested itself to the observing mind of the Autocrat of All the Russias who resolved himself to take the initiative.

The decision to give up the largest item of revenue at the moment of entering on a gigantic war, necessitating a tremendous expenditure, as well as a radical change, in a habit of the whole nation, was indeed heroic, and surpassing

in boldness any reform that has ever been undertaken. Six months have elapsed since the issue of the decree of prohibition, and none of the evil consequences foreseen by prudent and experienced statesmen has occurred. The income from the taxes of the country did not drop, but on the contrary, rose considerably over that of the preceding year, 1913. According to official reports, the revenue expected last December was surpassed by almost one-fifth. The productivity of the people increased between 30 and 40 per cent. The savings too were increased largely; in last December alone, by £2,834,700.

Wonderful success
of the reform.

From several trustworthy private sources the writer learns that the half-year of the prohibition has already resulted in a remarkable rise of the standard of living of the lower classes, who, with the money they used to squander on drinks, can afford to be better fed and better clothed than before. Instead of the expected resistance or dissatisfaction, there reigns everywhere, particularly among the peasants, a deep feeling of contentment with having got rid of such an inveterate and pernicious habit, also of gratitude to the Sovereign who imposed his will in that grave matter for the benefit of the people.* This heightened welfare and activity, as well as the consciousness of a successful exercise of their self-control, greatly increases the confidence of the Russians in the triumph of their efforts in the present war.

Its deep con-
sequences.

* In the sitting of the Douma of January 29 (February 11) last, a Member speaking on behalf of the Peasant Members of the Douma, a peasant himself, declared that, after the prohibition, "the population is become healthy, the number of the poor has decreased, the temples of God have become full of people, peace and quiet reign in family life, criminal trials and law-suits have diminished by half, the young generation is growing morally stronger."

CHAPTER XI.

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSIONS.

The two main-springs of Russia, Democracy and Monarchy.

In our brief survey of ten and a half centuries of Russian history we have, through all the evolutions of Russia, seen the working of two main principles, Democracy and Monarchy.

It was of their own free will that the Russian Democracy founded Monarchy when they appealed to Rurik to secure peace and order in their country. It was again by their free choice that the Russian people restored Monarchy when they elected as Tsar Michel Romanoff. There have never been conflicts between Monarchy and Democracy in Russia. All popular movements were in the name of the Tsar and against the partition wall which arose between him and his people, which it was as much in the interest of the Tsar as of the people to destroy. In their darkest thralldom the Russian people were always comforted by the Ideal grown up in the popular mind of a *People's Tsar* from whom they hoped to get freedom and justice.

Moscow Aristocracy.

Such a partition wall in the Moscow period was formed by the aristocracy. Peter the Great, who completely broke it, might have become a true *People's Tsar*. Unfortunately he was impelled by his genius to seek a rapid attainment to power and prosperity for Russia at the price of an immediate compulsory change in her entire mode of existence. Materially his work was crowned with success. The Empire he founded

quickly grew up to be immensely vast, populous and mighty. But it lost the vivifying spirit of nationality. In the St. Petersburg period the Emperors were separated from the people by a new and formidable wall, the Germanized bureaucracy. This bureaucracy acted arbitrarily and did not let the voice of the people reach the Sovereign. And the bureaucrats consistently favoured the penetration of Russia by the Germans, gave them the position of a ruling race there and placed the power of the Russian Empire at the service of the German cause, until Germany was unified and became the dominant Power in Europe.

Germanized
bureaucracy.

The Russian national revival began with the literary movement which awakened national consciousness and created public opinion. Both currents of it, the Liberal and the National, were essentially democratic and strove against the bureaucracy who tried to keep the Sovereign apart from the people. However, in spite of the precautions of the bureaucrats, the Tsars learned to know the true situation and took themselves the initiative of the reforms which the people desired. Alexander II. laid a broad basis for the democratization of the Russian State. Alexander III. Russified the foreign policy of Russia. Nicholas II. carried his grandfather's and his father's work through to a high degree. And in allowing the wishes of the people to reach his ears by the voice of their elected representatives, as well as by that of a free Press, the Emperor placed himself in direct communication with the people, and practically broke down the partition wall.

Russian national
revival.

The Tsars as
its leaders.

Russia is described in the "Almanach de Gotha" as '*Monarchie Constitutionnelle sous un Empereur Autocrate.*' It might with equal justice be called "Democratic Monarchy"

Russia the most
democratic
country in
Europe.

or "Monarchical Democracy." In no other country of Europe is the aristocratic element so weak as in Russia. There is no peerage and no representation of aristocracy in the Upper House. There is no right of primogeniture, and upon a father's death, his fortune is equally divided among all his sons, his daughters receiving a smaller share. (In practice it is often rendered equal to the sons' share.) Titles are inherited by all sons and daughters, and are therefore so multiplied that the bearing of a title does not necessarily indicate any superiority of position. The Russian Noblesse has no necessary connection with landed property, and since the emancipation of the serfs, especially since the agrarian troubles of ten years ago, the majority of the former gentry live in towns. Hereditary Noblesse is automatically acquired with the grade of Colonel in the Army and that of *Conseiller de Collège* in the Civil Service. There is besides a numerous "personal" Noblesse acquired by lower *tchins* (grades or degrees). Nothing astonishes Russians more when they visit Western Europe than the important position held there by the aristocracy even in countries claiming to be democratic; republican France, for instance, possesses a more solid aristocracy than Russia.

The most important class in Russia is the peasantry, which forms 90 per cent. of the whole population. The peasants who know that, through the guilt of the aristocracy, they had fallen in bondage and have been released by the Tsar, and who, moreover, have seen themselves ever since the object of special Imperial solicitude, are boundlessly devoted to the Tsar, and constitute a most solid foundation of Russian Monarchy. Perfect loyalty to the Emperor is general in all other classes. Public opinion certainly demands a consistent development of the Russian institutions necessary to make

The Russian
peasantry.

The public
opinion.

Russia a modern State, and criticizes the bureaucracy for not fully carrying out the liberal measures of the Sovereign ; the Press particularly complains of the bureaucrats' continued partiality for the German element in Russia. However, the confidence inspired by the whole trend of the policy adopted by the Emperor gives the progressive movement a steady and moderate character.

The Russian revolutionary movement has never been a popular one. It was limited to groups of intellectuals acting under the influence of German socialistic and anarchist writers and agitators. When those revolutionaries wanted to incite the masses to acts of violence against property, they employed forged proclamations in the name of the Tsar commanding the people to do so. They aimed at abolishing individual property and destroying the present organization of society ; they would, with equal bitterness, have fought a non-socialistic republic. Their criminal attempts against persons in high position, which excited universal abhorrence, were greatly due to the instigation and assistance of the enemies of Russia as a nation. It has lately been asserted that, on the declaration of war by Germany, the revolutionary leaders refused to listen to the suggestions of the German Ambassador in Petrograd, who was urging them to organize insurrectionary risings, and that these leaders broke off all relations with the enemies of their country. It is certain that on the very evening when that declaration became known in the Russian capital the workmen who were taking part in a seditious manifestation spontaneously began singing " God save the Tsar," and all the strikers resumed work next day. Whatever be the conduct of a few individuals, it seems that an overwhelming wave of patriotism swept over most of the agitators,

The so-called
Russian
revolutionaries.

Incited to insur-
rection by the
German
Ambassador.

who at once, like other Russians, concentrated all their thoughts on the longing for the victory for Russia.

The task of the present reign is still far from being completed. No substantial progress can be made in many reforms which are universally recognized as necessary until this great War is terminated. However, the reforms already achieved or initiated constitute a wonderful co-ordinate series of great acts of a manifestly great reign. Above all, they plainly show that the *Ideal* which the Russian people have borne in their hearts for so many centuries *is at last realized: the Russians have found the People's Tsar!*

The ideal of the
People's Tsar
realized.

No one could deny that by his latest decisions the Emperor Nicholas II. has united all parties and nationalities of the Russian Empire as they have never been united before. There are in Russia at present no revolutionaries and no reactionaries, but only Russians.

Union of all
Russians.

That fact is of the highest importance, not only for Russia herself, but also for her Allies, for the issue of the present War and for the future destinies of Europe.

The President of the Douma rightly said in the historical sitting of February 11th:—"This is the will of Russia." Everything we see and hear strengthens the conviction that the whole Russian Nation is unshakeable in its resolve to continue the War until all the Slavs are liberated, until the question of Russia's access to the open sea is settled, and until the legitimate interests of all our Allies are satisfied.

The sharp medicine of war is rapidly and thoroughly curing Russia of the German virus which for two centuries has poisoned the organism of that Empire. *The Russian Democracy is at last coming to its own again. Its union with Monarchy is indissolubly cemented and consecrated by the wise leadership of the great Slavic Tsar.*

The Russian
Democracy and
Monarchy indis-
solubly united.

POSTSCRIPT.



With the writing of the preceding lines the writer considered the task which he had set before himself as accomplished. He hears, however, from an English friend of Russia, whose opinion has a great value in the writer's eyes, that it would be worth while to add a further statement concerning the direction into which, after this war, Russia with her increased power and prestige, would turn her strength. Those who know her well—says the above-mentioned friend of Russia—believe that it will not be outwards, but to the development of her own resources. The Germans, and their conscious and unconscious helpers, however, are straining every means in their power to spread the apprehension that Russia will take the place of Germany as a dominant military Power and constitute an even greater danger for peace and liberty than has hitherto been Germany.

Will not victorious
Russia be more
dangerous than
Germany?

The writer is quite willing to follow the suggestion made in the mutual interest of both the Allied Nations, but he finds this additional task very much narrowed in consequence of an authoritative and impressive statement, which renders it superfluous to assure the British public of the Russian love of peace in the past and in the present. Mr. Lloyd George, than whom no one possesses the power of summing up in fewer and clearer words the whole substance of a question, stated

Mr. Lloyd George's
testimony of
Russia's love of
peace.

in his speech at Bangor, on February 28th, that he doubted if Russia ever made an aggressive war on her European neighbours, and added:—"Russia desired above everything peace." "She wanted peace, she needed peace, she would have had peace, had she been left alone." "She was at the beginning of a great industrial development, and she wanted peace in order to bring it to its full fructification. She had repeatedly stood insolences at the hands of Germany up to the point of humiliation, all for peace, and anything for peace." "Never was a nation so bent on preserving peace as Russia was."

That testimony appears to the writer to need no corroboration and to admit of no controversy. The only point which might conceivably be raised now is whether, under the influence of "increased power and prestige," Russia would not be tempted to imitate the ambitions of Germany.

The writer hopes to have shown that, after the recovery of her own shores—a geographical, economic and cultural necessity—all the European wars of Russia were due to German influence and served German ends to the detriment of Russian interests. They were entirely condemned by the Russian national conscience. The only wars which the Russian people approved of and longed for were the wars for the liberation of their brethren of creed and race, the Russian Crusades. Both these motives must needs disappear with the termination of the present war. As Russia will not cease fighting until all Eastern Christians as well as all Slavs are liberated, this war will be her last Crusade. And it is unthinkable that Russia should ever make war again to serve the purposes of Germany.

Moreover, all Russian parties are agreed that the annexation of any country with a non-Russian population would be most

All European wars of Russia are to German influence.

Wars for the liberation of Eastern Christians the only popular wars in Russia.

All Russians opposed to annexation of non-Russian populations.

undesirable. The only annexation which is regarded as acceptable is that of Eastern Galicia and Western Bucovina, inhabited by the Little Russian branch of the Russian nationality. That extension of territory will, however, be more than counterbalanced by the separation from Russia proper of an autonomous Poland. Thus, while the territory of the whole Empire will be increased by the reunion to Poland of the Polish provinces of Prussia and Austria, that of Russia proper will be diminished. This notwithstanding, no act of the Emperor, after the declaration of war on Germany, has been more unanimously welcomed by the Russian people than the restoration of national existence to Poland. This is evidently the reverse of aiming at conquests. And the sentiment shown on that occasion by the Russians is entirely in accordance with the well-understood interest of Russia. Nothing could render her Western frontier so safe as her having for neighbours friendly peoples, most of whom will owe to Russia their national existence and unity.

Universal approval in Russia of Polish autonomy.

A free access to the open sea in the South, another vital necessity of the economic development of Russia, will be a natural compensation for the immeasurable efforts and sacrifices made by Russia in the defence of the liberty and independence of Europe. That will also answer an equally vital need for the supply of corn to Western European States.

Russia satisfied with free access to an open sea in the South.

In the North, Russia's interests are identical with those of other Baltic and North Sea States; it is as essential for her as for them that, on those seas, there should be no aggressive predominance on the part of any power and that personal and commercial traffic should always be free and safe from piracy. One of the most successful German intrigues has been the creation of a panic in Sweden on account of an imaginary

Her interests in the Northern Seas identical with those of other States.

Russian invasion. It took Russians considerable time to realize that such a mare's nest found credit with such sensible and shrewd people as the Swedes generally are. Not the slightest indication in support of it could be discovered in the acts of the Russian Government or in the language of the Russian Press. All Russian politicians, whatever shade of opinion they belonged to, who have had an opportunity of stating their views on the matter, have been unanimous in repudiating those rumours, and in protesting that Russia had neither the wish to encroach on Scandinavian territory nor any interest in doing so. Fortunately, it appears that the Swedes themselves sifted the legends fabricated in Germany and found at last they were nothing but absurd inventions.*

The absence in the future of the motives which had determined a warlike policy on the part of Russia in the past, the satisfaction, in agreement with her Allies, of the legitimate claims of Russia, and the existence, in all political circles, as well as in the public opinion of Russia, of a decided and unanimous opposition to any expansion which involves an inclusion into Russia of non-Russian elements, offer quite sufficient guarantees against a pursuit of conquests and attempts at military domination. To these considerations of foreign policy must be added those, still more powerful, of Russian domestic policy.

Sufficient guarantees against a pursuit of conquests and attempts at domination.

* The sight, on their arrival in Sweden, of Russian civilians, mostly women and children, who had been detained and grossly ill-treated in Germany, strongly appealed to the natural kindness of the Swedes and moved them to give every possible help to these innocent victims of Teuton brutality. These acts of kindness, which greatly alleviated the sufferings of the poor Russian travellers returning to their country, kindled in the hearts of all Russians feelings of lasting gratitude and regard for the Swedish people and Sweden.

The present war has surprised Russia amidst momentous political, economic and social reforms, some of which had only just been inaugurated, and the full achievement of all of which is absolutely indispensable for her welfare and prosperity. Some of these reforms have been spoken of in the course of this work, as, for example, the passing of the peasantry, that is, of the 90 per cent. of the whole population, from communal to individual landownership and the peopling of Siberia, a country three times larger than the whole of European Russia. Besides these, there are others which do not yield to them in importance—the organization on a new basis of industry and of commerce, the general reform of education and particularly of technical education, the development of the local, municipal and provincial self-government, the regularization of the co-operation between both Houses of Parliament, as well as between each of them and all branches of the Government.

Absolute need to carry through the reforms interrupted by war.

All these reforms, and one or two more, must needs be carried through in one and the same spirit. They all must systematically tend to eradicate from the organism and life of Russia all traces of the German poison which had so long arrested and perverted the economic and moral progress of Russia. Until the task of a complete de-Germanization is accomplished, Russia will not be quite safe from a return of German influence and from renewed attempts to restore German domination. Legislative and administrative measures alone will not prove sufficient. There must be above all a full display of the free activities of the Russian people, an untrammelled growth of Russian national culture which has for two centuries been repressed and penalized by the Germanized bureaucracy.

The indispensable task of uprooting all German influence in Russia.

Untrammelled growth of Russian culture.

The Anglo-Franco-Russian Alliance as a basis of the foreign policy of Russia in the future.

This will be the true continuation of the work of Peter the Great, misunderstood and mishandled by his successors. As he sought assistance for raising the prosperity and civilization of Russia in close connection with England and France, so is the present Emperor also doing politically, economically and culturally. The political alliance planned by the great Peter is already most fully attained. Efforts are being made and must be made more closely to knit both fronts of the Grand Alliance, the Western and the Eastern, by material and intellectual ties. That Alliance, which gives satisfaction to the legitimate claims of each of its members, totally excludes on the part of any one the spirit of predominance or conquest.

Fundamental difference between the German and the Russian ideals.

All Russia is acclaiming and will continue to acclaim this new conception. There exists between the German and the Russian ideals a fundamental difference. "*Pangermanismus*" means the subjection of all nations to the German rule. "*Slavianofilstvo*," mistranslated by the Germans as Pan-slavism, means the liberation of all the Slavs, the Russians included, from the German yoke and the free development of the Slavic nations beside the Latin and the Teutonic in abiding and harmonious progress.

G. DE WESSELITSKY.

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